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Anomaly detection has been a well-studied area for a long time. Its applications in
the financial sector have aided in identifying suspicious activities of hackers. How-
ever, with the advancements in the financial domain such as blockchain and artificial
intelligence, it is more challenging to deceive financial systems. Despite these tech-
nological advancements many fraudulent cases have still emerged.
Many artificial intelligence techniques have been proposed to deal with the
anomaly detection problem; some results appear to be considerably assuring, but
there is no explicit superior solution. This thesis leaps to bridge the gap between ar-
tificial intelligence and blockchain by pursuing various anomaly detection techniques
on transactional network data of a public financial blockchain named ’Bitcoin’.
This thesis also presents an overview of the blockchain technology and its appli-
cation in the financial sector in light of anomaly detection. Furthermore, it extracts
the transactional data of bitcoin blockchain and analyses for malicious transactions
using unsupervised machine learning techniques. A range of algorithms such as iso-
lation forest, histogram based outlier detection (HBOS), cluster based local outlier
factor (CBLOF), principal component analysis (PCA), K-means, deep autoencoder
networks and ensemble method are evaluated and compared.
Keywords: blockchain, bitcoin, anomaly detection, unsupervised learning, fraud
detection, deep learning
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11 Introduction
Suspicious activities in network structures are as old as the invention of the network
structure itself. Entities or their activities which tends to behave abnormally within
the system is referred to as anomalies. Anomaly detection is widely used in a variety
of cybersecurity applications for targeting financial fraud identification, network
invasion detection, anti money laundering, virus detection, and more. Usually, a
common goal in these networks is to detect those anomalies and prevent such illegal
activities from happening in future. With advancements in technology, blockchain
emerges to plays a vital role in securing these network structures. Carlozo (2017)
elaborates that a blockchain is a decentralised distributed database that maintains
on-growing records and ensures that fraudulent records do not become part of this
database and previously added records stay immutable. However, participants of a
blockchain network can try to conduct illegal activities and in some cases succeed
in deceiving the system into their advantage.
Current state-of-the-art anomaly detection methodologies are designed and im-
plemented in light of the centralised systems. With the advent of blockchain technol-
ogy, it brings a need for anomaly detection procedures within these systems as well.
In this thesis, we extract and analyse the data from a publicly available blockchain
named bitcoin. Nakamoto (2008) states that bitcoin is a peer-to-peer digital cur-
rency blockchain, by using which users can send and receive a form of electronic
cash to each other anonymously without the need for any intermediaries.
This thesis aims to detect anomalous or suspicious transactions in the bitcoin
network, where all nodes are unlabeled, and there is no evidence that if any given
transaction is an illicit activity. The primary focus is to detect anomalies within the
bitcoin transaction network. Farren, Pham, and Alban-Hidalgo (2016) explained that
the problem is related to the study of fraud detection in all types of financial trans-
action blockchain systems. The problem can also be generalised to other blockchain
networks such as health service blockchains, public sector blockchains and many
others, and therefore this thesis investigates a more general problem of anomaly
detection in blockchains. Chapter 2 gives an in-depth background of blockchains
and its procedures, and it also explains the problem statement along with some
examples of problem use-cases. Chapter 3 discusses the history and development of
anomaly detection research in the focus of distributed ledger and blockchains. Some
research related to anomaly detection in financial systems is also discussed. Chap-
2ter 4 explains in detail the unsupervised machine learning techniques that have
been used for fraud detection in this thesis. Chapter 5 describes the technologies
used to perform experiments and explains the data exploration and pre-processing
along with the evaluation metrics used in this research. Chapter 6 describes the
anomaly detection experiments and their evaluation results. The code for experi-
ments is shared on Github1. The anomalies dataset2, bitcoin transactional dataset3
and bitcoin transaction network metadata4 used in experiments are donated to IEEE
Dataport. Chapter 7 details a comparison among all the evaluation results obtained
from conducting experiments so we can narrow down to an optimal solution. Fi-
nally chapter 8 concludes the research by explaining what we found and what can
be improved.
1https://github.com/epicprojects/blockchain-anomaly-detection
2https://ieee-dataport.org/open-access/bitcoin-hacked-transactions-2010-2013
3https://ieee-dataport.org/open-access/bitcoin-transactions-data-2011-2013
4https://ieee-dataport.org/open-access/bitcoin-transaction-network-metadata-2011-2013
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Use of ledger in the financial area is as ancient as money itself. From clay and stones
to papyrus and paper and later to spreadsheets in the digital era, ledgers have been
an essential part of accounting journey. Early digital ledgers have just merely mim-
icked the paper-based approaches of double entry book-keeping. However, still, there
remained a vast gap in consensus when these ledgers grew in volume and spatial-
ity. The rise in computing power and cryptography breakthroughs along with the
discovery of some new and sophisticated algorithms have given birth to distributed
ledgers.
2.1 Distributed ledger technology (DLT)
In the crudest form distribute ledger is merely a database whose copy is indepen-
dently held by each participant who wants to update it. These participants usually
are nodes on a network and records written on these databases are usually called
transactions. Distribution of these records is unique as they are not communicated
to other nodes in the network using a central authority node. However, instead of
that, each record is independently composed by each node individually. This leads
to all the participant nodes of the network to process all incoming transactions and
reach a conclusion about its authenticity. Finally, a consensus is achieved based on
majority votes of conclusions of the network. Once there is this consensus achieved
the distributed ledger is updated, and at this point, all nodes on the network main-
tain an identical copy of the ledger which holds all transactions. This architecture
enables a new dexterity as the system of records can go beyond being a simple
database.
Distributed ledger is a dynamic type of media that possesses the attributes and
capability go beyond legacy databases. The innovation of distributed ledgers allows
its users not only to accumulate and communicate information in a distributedly se-
cure manner but also enables them to go beyond relationships among data. Ibanez et
al. (2017) state that distributed ledgers provide a trustworthy, secure, and account-
able way of tracking transactions without the need for a central validating authority,
and they could provide the foundation to make the web a genuinely decentralised
autonomous system.
42.1.1 Blockchain
The blockchain is a type of distributed ledger. Apparent from its name it is a chain
of logically connected data blocks. A list of growing records refer to as blocks, and
each block contains a timestamp, transactional data and a unique cryptographic
hash. The hash in the block links it to the previous block in the distributed ledger
all the way to form a chain of logical links to the first block called genesis block using
these cryptographic hashes (Figure 2.1). The blockchain is a discrete design which
makes it resistant to modification of the data as well as duplicate entries. Iansiti
and Lakhani (2017) said that it is an open-distributed ledger that can be utilised to
document transactions among two unknown parties verifiably and permanently.
A blockchain usually uses a peer-to-peer network for seamless inter-node commu-
nication and validating new blocks. Once transaction data is appended to the block,
it cannot be altered retroactively without modification of all subsequent blocks. In
order to alter any record, it would require a consensus of the majority of network
nodes, which is highly challenging to achieve. Although records of a blockchain are
not immutable, still it may be considered the secure design and less prone to vulner-
abilities. It also illustrates a distributed computing system with high byzantine fault
tolerance. The decentralization and byzantine problem will be explained later in this
chapter. Raval and Siraj (2016) state that the blockchain claims to have achieved
decentralized consensus.
Figure 2.1. Example of a blockchain; Z. Zheng et al. (2017)
2.1.2 Hashgraph
In the world of distributed ledgers, blockchain has been taking all the spotlight.
However, blockchain comes with some design limitations. A consensus mechanism
called proof of work (POW) which will be discussed later in this chapter under
subsection protocols of blockchain is widely in use. As Bitcoin-Wiki (2016) explains,
proof of work algorithm can be considerably time-consuming in nature. An another
inherited inefficiency of blockchain design is that it consumes considerable amount
electricity even when it decides to discard the blocks.
5As Baird (2016) explains, hashgraph algorithm is a consensus mechanism based
on the directed acyclic graph (DAG) which uses a virtual voting system combined
with a gossip protocol described on Wikipedia (2018) to achieve consensus in a
faster, more reliable and secure manner. Hashgraph intends to provide the benefits
of blockchain as a distributed ledger but without the limitations. Contrary to many
ledgers which only use the gossip protocol, hashgraph utilises a voting algorithm in
combination with gossip of gossips in order to reach consensus without using proof
of work. This gossip of gossips is designed to share new information with other
participant nodes of the network which are unaware of this new knowledge using
hashgraph itself. Veronese et al. (2013) states that this guarantees Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT) as all participants are part of the gossip events. Burkhardt, Wer-
ling, and Lasi (2018) explain that hashgraph is DDoS attack resilient and provides
high transaction throughput, low consensus latency and proper absolute ordering of
transactions. It works asynchronously to nondeterministic achieve consensus using
probabilities. Since hashgraph is an early bird patented solution and is not open-
source, its commercial applications are still under consideration in industry.
2.2 Blockchain network
Blockchain networks define the communication channel of participant network nodes.
Gossip peer-to-peer network is the most commonly used network, but with the rise
in need of privacy, semi-gossiping networks and simple peer-to-peer networks are
also utilised. A blockchain also defines its scope and protocols concerning its network
with clarifies its intentions as a platform. Depending on the applications a blockchain
scope and protocol may vary from a small scale node infrastructure to a massive hub
platform. This thesis aims to propose a possible solution for all blockchain scopes,
but due to data availability reasons, a public blockchain is under study.
2.2.1 Scopes of blockchain
As mentioned by the Lin, Liao, and Lin (2017) there are three significant scopes of
a distributed ledger or a blockchain:
• Public - A state of the art public blockchain is open source and permission-
less. Participants do not require any permission to join the network. Anyone
can download its source code or binaries and run it locally on his or her com-
puter and start validating transactions coming to the network, consequently
joining the consensus process. This gives everyone on the network the ability to
6process and determine which new blocks will become part of the chain. Partic-
ipants of the network can send transactions onto the network and expect them
to become part of the ledger as long as they are valid. In public blockchains
transparency plays a key role, Each transaction on the blockchain ledger is
visible to everyone and can be read using block explorer. However, these trans-
actions are anonymous, so it is almost impossible to track the identity of the
transaction owner. Milutinovi (2018) has explained Bitcoin, Ethereum and
Litecoin which are some of the few examples of public blockchains.
• Consortium - Consortium blockchain regulates under the leadership of cer-
tain specific groups which follow same vision. Unlike public blockchains, they
publicly do not allow everyone with internet access to become a participant
of the network to verify the transactions. However, in some cases, the right
to read the blockchain can be defined by the groups so that the access to the
blockchain can be either public, restricted or hybrid. Consortium blockchains
are highly scalable and fast and provide more transactional privacy, so their
practical applications are more welcomed in industries. According to Buterin
(2016), consortium blockchains are ”partially decentralised”.
Usage of consortium blockchains is often in association with enterprises. Col-
laborating group of companies leverage blockchain technology for improved
business processes. Its application is already making waves in healthcare, sup-
ply chain, finance and other industries. Valenta and Sandner (2017) has men-
tioned that Quorum, R3 Corda and Hyperledger are some examples of consor-
tium blockchains.
• Private - In most cases, private blockchains are developed, maintained and
kept centralised under an organisation and are not open sourced. Read permis-
sions can be either public, restricted or hybrid based on system requirements.
In this closed environment, external public audits are required to maintain
the integrity of the system. Private blockchains take advantage of the tech-
nology while still keeping the solution to themselves. A potential security risk
is involved with the centralisation factor of private blockchains, but at the
same time, it enables several advantages over public blockchains such as pre-
approved network participants and known identities. MONAX and Multichain
are few known examples of private blockchains mentioned by Sajana, Sindhu,
and Sethumadhavan (2018).
72.2.2 Consensus of blockchain
Skvorc (2018) elaborates that there are three primary consensus mechanisms of a
distributed ledger or a blockchain:
• Proof of work (POW) - To keep the decentralised system secure and ro-
bust, proof of work plays an important role. The idea behind proof of work
is to make participants of the network approve actual transactions and dis-
approve fraudulent ones. Approved transactions are added to a block which
later becomes part of the blockchain ledger, and for this, the network rewards
the participants. At core proof of work solely depends on computing power.
Some participant nodes of the network engage in a competition known as the
mining process to finding a hash called nonce (number used once). This hash
is an extract of solving a complex mathematical problem that is part of the
blockchain program. Combining this hash with the data in the block and then
passing it through the hash function produces a result in a certain range which
can become part of the blockchain. Since hash function makes it impossible to
predict the output, so the participant nodes have to guess to find this hash.
The node which finds the hash first is allowed to add its block to the blockchain
and receive the reward. This reward usually comprises tokens that user can
utilise on the same network. Amount of the reward is defined dynamically
within the blockchain program and can mutate over time.
• Proof of stake (POS) - Proof of stake proposes to overcome the comput-
ing race in proof of work. In proof of work participants of the network can
join together to create a pool of nodes in order to mine blocks faster and
collect rewards. This network pool ends up utilising more electricity and ap-
proaches toward a more centralised network topology. Instead of letting all
the participants competing with each other for mining blocks proof of stake
uses an election process in which a participant is selected to validate the next
block. These selected participants are called validators. To become a validator
a node has to deposit a certain amount of tokens into the network as a stake
of security collateral. Size of the stake determines the chances of a validator
be chosen to forge the next block. A validator node checks for all the trans-
actions within a block are valid and signs the block before adding it to the
blockchain, consequently receiving the reward. Trust of the validator nodes
depends on their deposited stake; validators will lose a part of their deposit if
they approve fraudulent transactions.
8• Proof of Authority (POA) - With popularity in private blockchains, proof
of authority uses a voting algorithm to validate the blocks. A group of known
and authorised nodes votes on which transaction should be approved and
added to the block. This results in higher throughput and shorter verifica-
tion time compared to proof of work. Many industries back this consensus
mechanism due to its control over the system approvals. However, to reach the
accurate decentralisation decisions of trusted participant nodes should not be
influenced by anyone.
Figure 2.2. Scopes and consensus mechanisms of a blockchain.
92.3 Blockchain security
The core idea behind blockchain security is to allow people, particularly those who
do not trust one another to share valuable information in a secure and tamper-
proof manner. Sophisticated decentralised storage and consensus algorithms make
it extremely difficult for attackers to manipulate the system. Encryption plays an
essential role in the whole process and validates the communication channels of the
network. Another critical problem blockchain claims to resolve is byzantine agree-
ment. It defines the dependability of the system in case of failure.
2.3.1 Decentralization
Centrally held data is highly prone to a variety of risks. Blockchain eliminates this
risk by storing data in a decentralised fashion on a peer-to-peer network. It is hard to
exploit the vulnerabilities of a peer-to-peer network due to lack of centralised points.
Moreover, it also ensures that there is no single point of failure in the system. Brito
and Castillo (2013) explain that blockchain uses cryptographic public-private keys
to communicate ensuring privacy and security of network nodes. Usage of private
keys to encrypt and public keys to decrypt makes blockchain highly secure. The-
Economist (2015) stated that generally, the data on blockchain is incorruptible. Data
quality is also ensured with decentralisation as there is no official, centralised copy
of a record and trust of each node is on the same level.
2.3.2 Byzantine Problem
A Byzantine problem, as explained by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease (1982), states
that computers on a decentralised network cannot be entirely and irrefutably guar-
anteed that they are displaying the same data. Considering the unreliability of the
network nodes can never be sure if the data they communicated has reached its
destination. At its essence byzantine problem is about achieving consensus across
a distributed network of nodes, while few nodes on the network could be possibly
faulty and may also attempt to attack the network. A Byzantine node can mislead
and may provide corrupted information to other nodes involved in the consensus
process. Blockchain has to operate with robustness in such situation and reach con-
sensus despite the interference of these byzantine nodes. Even though Byzantine
problem cannot be fully solved, different blockchains and distributed ledgers utilise
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various consensus mechanisms like proof of work and proof of stake to overcome the
problem in a probabilistic manner.
2.4 Bitcoin
The earliest known design of a cryptographically chained data linked in chains and
blocks was by Haber and Stornetta (1990). They purposed a system in which doc-
uments time stamps could not be tempered or backdated. Later on Bayer, Haber,
and Stornetta (1993) added Merkle trees to the design which enhanced efficiency
and allowed accumulation of multiple documents into a block. However, the first
ever conceptualisation of a blockchain was introduced by a person with pseudonym
Nakamoto (2008). Consequently, giving birth to the first blockchain system. This
blockchain system was named ’Bitcoin’ and is designed as peer-to-peer electronic
cash system otherwise knows as a cryptocurrency. Bitcoin serves a public ledger
for all transactions of the network and is capable of representing currency digitally
hence working as electronic cash. A digital representation of an asset can lead to
multiple problems. Bitcoin is developed to tackle some significant problems. Firstly,
in theory, the digitally represented asset can technically be duplicated which is not
acceptable. As this replication of a digital asset can confuse actual ownership of the
asset. Secondly, the replicated asset can be spent multiple times resulting in chaos in
the system, Usman W. Chohan (2017) states that this problem is also known as the
double spend problem. Bitcoin solves this problem by using proof of work (POW)
algorithm (Fig 2.3). Utilising proof of work mechanism miners verify transactions
for their authenticity and get rewarded in newly generated bitcoins.
Figure 2.3. Proof of work illustration; Barrera (2014)
However, bitcoin blockchain is designed with some specific rules, such as there can
be only 21 million bitcoins. As fig 2.4 illustrates, each transaction is encrypted with
the private key of the sender. This transaction is enclosed with a digital signature
and public key of the receiver and sent to the receiver address. This technique allows
the asset to be securely delivered only to the receiver address and can be verified
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using the digital signature. Identities of sender and receiver are anonymous as they
can generate new addresses before initiating a new transaction.
Figure 2.4. Simple bitcoin transaction; Barrera (2014)
Bitcoin transactions can consist of one or more inputs and one or more outputs.
When sending bitcoins to an address, a user designates the address and the amount
being sent and encapsulates it in the output of transaction in order to keep track
of double spending. As mentioned by Delgado-Segura et al. (2018) it is known as
unspent transaction output (UTXO) model, which implies that each transaction
input is a pointer to the output of the previous transaction. Figure 2.5 shows an
example where a customer sends 2 BTC to the address of the vendor, then the
vendor sends 0.8 BTC of those 2 BTC to the provider address, and change of 1.2
BTC is the returned back to the vendor.
Figure 2.5. Linked bitcoin transactions; Barrera (2014)
There are many elements involved when participants of network transmit bit-
coins. However, we can break down the activities in two groups; User activities and
Transaction activities. In this thesis, our prime interest is in transaction activities
and its analysis for suspicious behaviour. Transactions on bitcoin blockchain are
fairly more complex in depth but since the scope of this thesis is to analyse the bit-
coin transactional data this thesis sheds light on the analytical perspective of bitcoin
data. Chapter 5 discuss the anatomy of transaction activities regarding elements of
data and structure.
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2.5 Anomaly detection
Zimek and Schubert (2017) explain anomaly detection as the identification of unique
items, observations or events that elevate suspicion by being significantly different
from the majority of the data. Usually, anomalous items are interpreted as kind
of abnormalities such as credit card fraud, structural defect or error in the text.
Anomalies can also be depicted as noise, outliers and novelties. However, Pedregosa
et al. (2011) explain that there is a significant difference between outlier detection
and novelty detection. In the context of novelty detection, training data is not pol-
luted by outliers, and we are interested in detecting whether a newly introduced
observation is an abnormality for the system or not. Whereas, in the case of outlier
detection, training data contains outliers which are defined as observations that are
far from the others.
This thesis primarily focuses on detecting anomalies in blockchain data struc-
ture. Regardless of the domain of blockchain one can apply specific techniques to this
data structure and attempt to identify anomalies. This is an unsupervised learning
problem and data for anomaly detection cases is usually highly imbalanced. Due to
data availability and academic literature, this thesis intends to make use of a public
financial blockchain known as bitcoin. Bitcoin’s transactional data goes through an
intense pre-processing phase, and later various modelling methods are applied in
order to identify transactions that are related to theft, heists or money laundering.
A comprehensive evaluation process is performed that seeks to outline the optimal
solution after comparing models. Studies in similar context have been carried out re-
cently, however this thesis endeavours to approach the blockchain anomaly detection
problem in a generalised way. Moreover, it also offers use of cutting-edge machine
learning algorithms along with graph theory to analyse anomalies within blockchain
data in an innovative manner.
2.6 Cyber fraud as a problem
Computer-oriented crimes have grown dramatically in the last past few decades.
Making digital security highly essential in all domains. Sandle and Char (2014) is-
sued a report estimating 445 billion USD annual damage to the global economy.
According to Smith (2015) cybercrime costs can go as high as 2.1 trillion by 2019.
North-Denver-News (2015) stated that in 2012 approximately 1.2 billion USD were
lost to financial credit card fraud in the US. European-Central-Bank (2014) report
reveals that 1 EUR in every 2,635 EUR on debit and credit card is lost to fraud. Al-
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though cybercrimes can be further categorised into cyberterrorism, cyberextortion,
cyberwarfare and financial fraud crimes; The prime focus of this thesis is in light of
financial area.
2.6.1 Financial cyber frauds
The financial sector is one of the most affected domains by cyber crimes. The vul-
nerabilities of users and sometimes systems are the primary reasons for security
breaches and hacks. Although the arrival of the blockchain has mitigated several
risks dramatically, however, the majority of financial systems are hesitant of the up-
grade due to internal policies and bureaucracy. Financial industry suffers enormous
losses every year. Credit card frauds are the one the most common type of cyber
fraud that takes places all over the world. Artificial intelligence plays a vital role
in detecting credit card fraud, but still a significant amount of hackers are never
caught. Krebs (2013) explains that around 40 million sets of payment card data
were compromised in the hack on Adobe Systems. The information compromised
included encrypted card payment number, customer names, card expiration dates
and other order related information of customers. McCurry (2016) states in The
Guardian that a coordinated attack was carried out by 100 individuals who used
the data of 1600 South African credit cards to steal 12.7 million USD from 1400
stores within 3 hours. They also managed to flee from Japan before the authorities
even discovered the heist. Even though many countermeasures are taken to make
credit and debit cards secure, such cases depict that centralised systems are still
vulnerable, ultimately exposing the whole financial industry to risk.
2.6.2 Blockchain thefts and heists
Blockchains bring privacy and security to the architecture of finance. However, cer-
tain people have been successful in fooling this in theory unbreakable infrastructure.
The purpose of these hackers is usually to carry out an illegal activity without get-
ting noticed. In order to do so, these hackers have to either tint their tracks or
completely deceive the system in believing that their activities are legit. Several
small to medium scaled cases usually never get reported. However, some big ones
can make headlines. Bitcoin, being the first and oldest financial blockchain has also
encountered many illegal activity challenges. Reid and Harrigan (2011) describe a
Bitcoin theft known as ’All In Vain’ in which around 25,000 bitcoins were stolen.
Figure 2.6 is a visual representation of the theft patterns.
The red node in the graph above represents the hacker and green node victim.
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Figure 2.6. All in vain robbery network; Reid and Harrigan (2011)
A single bitcoin was stolen at the beginning which later led to the actual heist of
25,000 bitcoins. As seen in Figure 2.6, the hacker tried to hide his illegal activity by
tainting the bitcoins using several small transactions. Moreover, a victim with the
alias Stone-Man (2010) has written on bitcoin forum about his loss. 8999 bitcoins
were robbed from him using his original private key. The victim in this case initially
bought 9000 bitcoins from an exchange. Later on, he transferred these those to a
disc and also backed up them in a USB flash drive. He also sent a single bitcoin
to himself on another address for some unknown reason. After confirmation and
backing up all the data of his wallet he later realised that there is an unrecognised
transaction of 8999 bitcoins to an unknown address that he did not approve. Figure
2.7 illustrates how without his consent the bitcoins were hacked and sent to another
address.
Figure 2.7. Stone man loss robbery; Blockchain.com (2018)
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These examples illustrate some of the patterns that can be suspicious. Hence, we
can mark similar activities and patterns as anomalies and attempt to create a model
that can detect them. Bitcoin is also notorious about its use for illegal activities on
the dark web such has involvement with money laundering, drugs and weapons.
Individuals have exploited the technology as a payment system on the dark web to
buy and sell illegal items and services. Christin (2013) explains how an online black
market ’Silk Road’ founded in 2011 and based on the dark internet was used to sell
illegal drugs. Its monthly revenue was about 1.2 million USD. In October 2013 the
USA Federal Bureau of Investigation shut down the website and arrested the person
behind. Effects of these illegal activities damage not only the social credibility of
the blockchain but also affects its value. Figure 2.8 shows a downfall in the market
of bitcoin when the silk road seizure happened.
Figure 2.8. Effect of the silk road seizure; Wikimedia-Commons (2018)
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3 Related work
Anomaly detection is broadly used in a wide area of applications such as fault detec-
tion, intrusion detection, fraud detection along with many others. The primary focus
of this thesis is on fraud detection. Fraud detection is a well-studied area and can
be partitioned into several sectors such as credit card fraud, virus intrusion, insur-
ance fraud and many more. These researches usually utilise a variety of techniques
to perform their analysis such as machine learning algorithms and network analy-
sis methods. Recent development in the industry and previous research by Bolton,
Hand, et al. (2001) shows that unsupervised machine learning algorithms behave in
a more focused manner toward anomalies. However according to Phua et al. (2010)
majority of fraud detection studies employs supervised machine learning techniques
and focus on developing a complex model to learn the patterns of anomalies within
the training data. Since applications of distributed ledger technologies are relatively
new, the fraud detection research in this area is still ongoing. Blockchain technology
is based on decentralized networks. It is observed from previous studies that in the
majority of blockchain research use-cases, researchers either treat the problem from
a network data perspective or crude data perspective. This chapter explains how
previous researches have tackled blockchain anomaly detection problem and what
approaches and outcomes they were able deduce.
3.1 Network based studies
B. Huang et al. (2017) approached the problem from a network behavioural pattern
detection perspective. The data used in this study is not made public. According
to the authors, this technique applies to every blockchain due to its generalised
nature. However, the core idea behind is to find the behavioural patterns in the
blockchain network and categorise them using newly introduced Behavior Pattern
Clustering (BPC) technique. Transaction amounts changing over time are extracted
as sequences to be clustered into several categories. These sequences are measured
using similarity measuring algorithms; this study talks about Euclidean distance,
Morse and Patel (2007) Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), Chen, O¨zsu, and Oria
(2005) Edit Distance on Real sequence (EDR) and Longest Common Sub-Sequences
(LCSS) by Vlachos, Kollios, and Gunopulos (2002). Authors of this study conducted
tests and selected DTW as a sequence measure and dropped EDR and LCSS because
blockchain data is noiseless and they focus on handling noisy data. A customised
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version of K-means is introduced to detect patterns in the network which is named
Behaviour Pattern Clustering (BPC), and results of BPC are compared with Hi-
erarchical Clustering Method (HIC) and Density Based Method (DBSCAN). Final
results showed that the BPC algorithm is more effective than existing methods. This
study approached the blockchain network anomaly problem from an algorithmic as-
pect.
Signorini et al. (2018) focused on blockchain anomaly detection from a more net-
working nodes viewpoint. This research focuses on detecting and eliminating eclipse
attacks. As explained by Heilman et al. (2015), eclipse attacks target single user
nodes of the network instead of attacking the network as a whole. The attacker can
hijack victims incoming and outgoing communication stream and inject malicious
code in the system. Agenda of such attacks is usually to take over the control of the
complete network which can cause severe damage to all users. The essence of this
research is to contribute a decentralised system that can make use of all information
collected from previous forks to protect the system against anomalous activities.
Evolution of forks in a blockchain are prone to malicious activities and since eclipse
attack happens on a single node rest of the network never gets informed about it.
Signorini et al. (2018) proposed to create a blacklist that can inform other peers of
the network about the malicious activity. A thread database is maintained to accu-
mulate all known attacks which are later used to detect anomalies in the network.
A toy network was set up to perform experimentation of the proposed solution, and
it performed positively. Machine learning techniques are considered to be added in
future studies which can enable this research to create a prediction model that can
detect heterogeneous malicious transactions.
Pham and Lee (2016b) has proposed to approach Bitcoin blockchain anomaly
detection from a network perspective. Based on Reid and Harrigan (2013), they
converted the Bitcoin data into a network like structure, which is further divided into
two primary graphs, user graph and transaction graph. The extracted user graph is
used to attempt detection of suspicious users, while the transaction graph is used to
attempt the discovery of suspicious transactions. Utilising both graphs, they not only
try to detect abnormal users and activities but also establish a link among both. This
results in a system that can also associate suspicious users with unusual transactions.
Metadata of both graphs is extracted to create a new dataset which they have not
made public. This metadata contains features such as in-degree, out-degree, balance
amount of graph nodes and many other vital variables. Emerging dataset is quite
large and includes all data of bitcoin blockchain from its creation to April 7th, 2013.
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6,336,769 users along with 37,450,461 transactions were processed. Methods used for
network anomaly analysis in the bitcoin network were K-means clustering motivated
by Othman et al. (2014), Power Degree & Densification Laws inspired by Leskovec,
Kleinberg, and Faloutsos (2007) and Local Outlier Factor (LOF) as mentioned by
Breunig et al. (2000). K-means clustering is used in combination with Local Outlier
Factor (LOF). To narrow down the list of potential k-nearest-neighbours in LOF,
indices are calculated from K-means clustering. List of nodes for each cluster is
obtained from k-means, and later on, a k-nearest-neighbour search is carried out to
save computational time. Due to the computational limitations of experiments, only
a small subset of extracted features were processed. One case of the anomaly was
successfully detected out of 30 known cases. Challenges faced by the researchers in
this study were mostly related to performing evaluation and validation. In reference
to this study, LOF seemed to perform better than others at the network data of
bitcoin. Moreover, this research does not talk about the false positive and true
negative cases.
Zambre and Shah (2013) published a report that analysed bitcoin network dataset
for frauds. Bitcoin network data analysed by this report was limited, containing net-
work data only up to July 13, 2011. This report focused on detecting rogue users of
the network who could potentially exploit network; dataset contained three known
rogue users and 628 known victims. Provided graph-based data was used to extract
more features out of the actual dataset, and a small subset of extracted features
was selected to perform the final analysis. K-means algorithm was selected to create
clusters of rogue and good users. On a high-level, this report was able to identify
the rogue users but still was not able to create a clear separation between rogue and
good users. Due to the lack of quality data, synthetic data was also generated using
resemblance from robbery patterns. Analysis of synthetic data resulted in 76.5%
accuracy rate, but non-synthetic data performed quite poorly.
3.2 Crude data based studies
Pham and Lee (2016a) have also published another study in which they researched
anomaly detection in the bitcoin data using unsupervised learning methods. This
study used the same dataset as their other study but approached the problem from a
machine learning based perspective. The dataset comprised of graph metadata from
the bitcoin user graph and transaction graph is pre-processed to extract a subset of
features. Unsupervised machine learning algorithms chosen for this study were K-
means clustering, Mahalanobis distance based method and Unsupervised Support
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Vector Machines (SVM). The study was able to detect two known cases of theft and
one known case of loss out of 30 known cases. Moreover, it does not address the
false positive and true negative cases.
The research of P. Monamo, Marivate, and Bheki Twala (2016) took a slightly
different approach to the bitcoin fraud detection problem. Bitcoin dataset provided
by Brugere (2013) from Laboratory for Computational Biology at the University of
Illinois is used in this research and is now unavailable due to unforeseen reasons.
This research aimed to use K-means clustering and a variant of K-mean clustering
proposed by Cuesta-Albertos, Gordaliza, Matra´n, et al. (1997) in a multivariant
setup to detect suspicious users and their related anomalous transactional activity.
According to the authors, K-means clustering is capable of grouping similar instances
together but lacks the prowess to detect anomalies, and Local outlier factor (LOF) is
popular with outlier detection however it cannot be scaled for large datasets due to
its computational complexity. This paper aimed to purpose an approach that could
overcome the weakness of the mentioned algorithms. This study was able to perform
comparatively better and was able to detect five fraudulent users out of 30.
A multifaceted approach was taken by P. M. Monamo, Marivate, and Bhesipho
Twala (2016) to detect global and local outlier in the bitcoin network. Dataset used
in this study is same as above mentioned studies and was also taken from Labora-
tory for Computational Biology at the University of Illinois by Brugere (2013). Data
points farther away from the centroids of clusters regarding euclidian distance were
considered Global outliers and were analysed using trimmed K-means according to
Cuesta-Albertos, Gordaliza, Matra´n, et al. (1997). Whereas by using kd-trees by
Bentley (1975) the data points which had a significant distance from the nearest
predetermined number of neighbours were considered local outliers. Top 1% of se-
lective anomalous data was labelled as anomalies and the remainder was labelled as
normal instances. Both supervised and unsupervised techniques were used in this
study to analyse the network data. This study followed a pipeline in which data
was pre-processed and labelled as normal or anomalous and then contextual binary
classification techniques were applied to extract final analysis. The algorithms used
for supervised classification were maximum-likelihood, logistic regression by Sarkar,
Midi, and Rana (2011), boosted logistic regression by Friedman, Hastie, Tibshirani,
et al. (2000) and random forest as mentioned by Breiman (2001). Thirty known
fraudulent activities were evaluated against the analysis and unsupervised approach
with K-means and kd-trees worked in collaborative agreement to detect anomalies.
Five global anomalies were able to be identified by using K-means whereas in local
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outliers kd-trees was able to identify 7 of the known thefts using. The two algo-
rithms remained in agreement 22% of the time. In supervised learning, 70% of data
was selected as training set while rest as the test set and 10-fold cross-validation
was performed for evaluation for all algorithms. Results showed that random forests
perform better as compared to others and were able to detect eight known thefts
irrespective of class asymmetries. Moreover, this study also reveals important fea-
tures that were able to learn patterns of anomalous activity in this particular study
and also that local outlier detection works more efficiently as compared to global.
Hirshman, Y. Huang, and Macke (2013) aimed to make the exploration of bit-
coin data easier, attempting to detect money laundering over bitcoin network using
mixing services and tracking the outputs of mixing services back to their inputs.
Whereas mixing services pools in money from different sources and mix them with
intention to confuse the trail back to the funds original source. This study also uses
the same bitcoin network dataset created by Brugere (2013) at the University of
Illinois. Pre-processing techniques by Reid and Harrigan (2013) were used to asso-
ciate public keys to users in order to establish a logical relationship within data.
K-mean by James MacQueen et al. (1967) was used in combination Role Extraction
(RolX)algorithm by Henderson et al. (2012) in an unsupervised manner for analy-
sis. This study takes a unique approach of restructuring the dataset to uncover the
laundering anomalies. It introduced a concept of hubs in which users with a high
number of transactions were filtered to make dataset more effective for unsupervised
algorithms. However, the result statistics were not shared in this research.
Patil et al. (2018) utilised a data mining approach to detect fraud in the bitcoin
blockchain. Transactional data is used in this research to detect anomalies within
the blockchain; It is an assumption that the majority of the network transactions
are legitimate and only 1% of total data is fraudulent. The proposed system intends
to scan the internal data with provided feature variables to filter out the fraudulent
transactions. Data goes under pre-processing to eliminate the missing values, and
a trimmed version of K-means clustering technique is utilised to categorise data
into two clusters that represent fraudulent and legal transactions. As there is no
labelled data available, it is very challenging to validate the results of the model
for flagged suspicious activities. However, the research shows a promising result
with improved detection rate with respect to previous studies. The future scope of
research intends to do experimentation with under and oversampling of data as well
as looking into the possibility of analysing data with graph-based algorithms and
supervised machine learning algorithms.
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In addition to heterogeneous data analysis, visual analysis has also attained
popularity. Bogner (2017) seeks to understand and analyse anomaly detection in
blockchains using visualised features. Their research not only proposed a theoretical
approach but also practically implemented a solution to support it. The proposed
solution runs a decentralized application on top of Ethereum blockchain and collects
statistics from the blockchain to store it in a NoSQL database which later provides
customizable visualisations and dashboards. A sophisticated machine learning core
operates over the stored data to create visual analysis and detect anomalies online,
and the results are represented visually on dashboards. Such an approach opti-
mises interpretability and visualizability of machine learning algorithms. Studies on
anomaly detection in the bitcoin have mostly focused on the transaction structure
of the bitcoin network. However, ethereum blockchain with its smart contracts pro-
duces a complex context for analysis hence this research complements to transaction
graph analysis strategy of previous researchers.
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4 Anomaly detection methods
Anomaly detection is categorized into three main types of learning methods; Su-
pervised learning methods, Semi-Supervised learning methods and Unsupervised
learning methods. Majority of real-world anomaly detection problems fall under un-
supervised learning domain such as credit card fraud detection, network intrusion
detection and our blockchain fraudulent transaction detection. This thesis deems
supervised and semi-supervised learning methods out of the scope and aims to focus
entierly on unsupervised learning methods.
Unsupervised learning is the most flexible type of learning, as it does not require
any class labels for training. It scores the data based on its intrinsic attributes
such as distance, density or more and attempts to distinguish the anomalies from
the standard data based on estimation. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the majority
of unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms can be roughly categorized into the
following main groups Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar (2009). This illustration is
updated and differs from the original publication.
Figure 4.1. A taxonomy of unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms that
are used most in practice; Goldstein and Uchida (2016)
This thesis selectively implements a set of unsupervised anomaly detection meth-
ods that can handle a large amount of data and can compute results in a reasonable
time. Following sub-sections of this chapter will explain these algorithms in more
depth.
4.1 Isolation Forest
Liu, Ting, and Zhou (2008) published an algorithm called ”isolation forest” for
unsupervised anomaly detection that achieved much popularity in recent years. The
idea behind isolation forest is that it is comparatively more straightforward to isolate
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anomalies from the data than to build a model that could estimate normal behaviour.
In order to isolate an anomalous observation, the dataset is randomly and recursively
partitioned until the only data point left in the partition is the observation. A tree
structure is used to represent the recursive partition. The base of the isolation forest
algorithm is on the ensemble of isolation trees, A forest of random isolation trees is
constructed to estimate the measure of normality and abnormality of observations
in the dataset.
An isolation forest is a combination of isolation trees, and these trees are actual
binary trees in which each node has either zero or two child nodes. Let N be a node
which is either a leaf node with no children or parent node with two child nodes Nl
and Nr . To decide which children nodes go to which parent node a test is associated
with node N. This test involves selecting a random feature q from the data and a
random split point p such that the nodes p < q are under Nl and p ≥ q are under
Nr .
Multiple random trees are formed recursively, and data is partitioned in each
one of them unless all observations are isolated for each iteration. The path length
from the root node of the tree to the leaf defines the number of partitions required
to isolate that observation. It is observed that for randomly partitioned data, the
path length of anomalies is shorter than of standard observations. One of the reasons
for this phenomenon to occur is that usually the number of anomalies in a dataset
is smaller than the number of standard observations, which results in a shorter
number of partitions and hence makes isolation of anomalous observation easier.
Another reason for anomalous observations to be separated in earlier partitioning
is that they have distinct attribute values as compared with standard observations.
Figure 4.2 illustrates that anomalies are more sensitive to isolation. The figure below
depicts the anomalous observation xo requires only four partitions to be isolated,
whereas isolating standard observation xi requires twelve random partitions.
Given a dataset X = {x1, x2, ... , xn} containing n observations, random recursive
isolation trees are built until each tree reaches the hight limit of |X| = 1 or all data
in X have the same value. Presuming majority of data in X is distinct, and the
isolation tree is fully grown, each observation is isolated to a leaf node. Then the
tree will have n leaves and n-1 internal nodes, in total 2n-1 nodes. The path length
of an observation x can be calculated by heuristic h(x) which is a measurement of
the count of edges it takes to traverse from the root node to the leaf node. In order
to use the isolation forest as an anomaly detection technique, it has to generate
comparable anomaly scores as h(x) cannot be directly used as an anomaly score. It
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Figure 4.2. The visual difference between the isolation of a standard obser-
vation xi versus an anomalous observation xo; Liu, Ting, and Zhou (2008)
is because while the maximum height of a tree grows in the order of n, the average
height grows in the order of log n. Isolation trees have a similar structure as binary
search trees (BSTs). Therefore the average path length of a failed search in a binary
search tree is comparable to the average of h(x). As stated by Preiss (2008), the
average path length of a failed BST search in a tree with n nodes can be calculated
as
c(n) = 2H(n − 1) − (2(n − 1)/n) (4.1)
where H(i) ≈ ln(i) + 0.5772156649 (Eulers constant). The anomaly score s for
an observation x is defined as:
s(x, n) = 2− E(h(x))c(n) (4.2)
Here E(h(x)) is the mean of all the h(x) from all isolation trees. While training an
isolation forest algorithm, isolation trees are randomly created as explained above.
Training requires two parameters: the number of trees t and the sub-sampling size.
Tree height limit l is calculated based on the sub-sampling size. The sub-sampling
process controls the data size for training and is an essential variable as it can directly
affect the performance of the classifier. As a different sub-sample is picked to create
an isolation tree each time, it can help isolate the anomalies in a better way. As for
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anomaly prediction from the trained model, Equation (4.2) is used to calculate an
anomaly score s as explained above. This anomaly score s ranges between the values
from [0,1] where values being more close to 1 are more likely to be anomalies.
4.2 Histogram-based Outlier Score (HBOS)
Goldstein and Dengel (2012) introduced an unsupervised algorithm for anomaly
detection. Histogram-based Outlier Score (HBOS) is a statistics-based method de-
signed to handle large datasets. Its computation complexity is an attractive attribute
for researchers.
A univariant histogram is created for each data feature. For categorical data
frequency of values for each category is calculated, and the height of the histogram
is computed. For numerical features, either static bin-width histograms technique
or dynamic bin-width histogram technique is used. The static bin-width method
uses k equal width bins over a value range, and the height of the bin is estimated by
counting the samples which fall in each bin. The dynamic bin-width is determined by
sorting all data points and then grouping a fixed number N/k of consecutive values,
where N represents the number of total observations k represents the number of
bins. Both static and dynamic approaches are introduced in this algorithm because
real-world data have very different feature distributions, especially when features
have a significant range of gaps in between. A fixed bin may estimate the density
of anomalies poorly resulting in adding most of the data to a few bins. Anomaly
detection problems usually have considerable gaps in the data range as most outliers
are far away from standard observations. The authors mostly prefer the dynamic
method if data distributions are unknown. The technique used to determine the
value of k bins is the square root of instances N.
A particular histogram is computed for each dimension d, and density is esti-
mated for the height of each bin. Normalization is applied over histograms so that
their maximum height is 1.0. By doing so each feature is ensured to be weighted
equally for anomaly score. HBOS for each observation p is computed using equation
(4.3)
HBOS(p) =
d∑
i=0
log
(
1
histi(p)
)
(4.3)
An inverse multiplication of the estimated densities defines the score, assuming
independence of features in similar manner to Kim et al. (2004). This score can also
be represented as an inverse of discrete Naive Bayes where instead of multiplication
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a sum of logarithms is used, using the fact that log(a·b) = log(a) + log(b). The
reason for this trick is to make the HBOS algorithm less susceptible to errors due
to floating-point precision, which can cause very high anomaly scores for extremely
unbalanced distributions.
4.3 Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF)
He, Xu, and Deng (2003) proposed an algorithm named cluster-based local out-
lier factor (CBLOF) that has properties of a cluster-based algorithm as well as the
Breunig et al. (2000) local outlier factor (LOF) algorithm. The idea of anomaly de-
tection in this algorithm revolves around clustering the data which are later used to
compute an anomaly score in a similar way to LOF. Any arbitrary clustering algo-
rithm can be plugged in the clustering step. However, the quality of the clustering
algorithm’s results directly influences the quality of CBLOF’s results.
The algorithm proceeds in a manner that it clusters a dataset D using an ar-
bitrary clustering algorithm and assigns each observation in D to a cluster. Their
respective sizes sort the clusters such that |C1 | ≥ |C2 | ≥ ··· ≥ |Ck | where C1, C2, ... ,
Ck represent all clusters with k as the number of clusters. The intersection of any pair
of clusters should be an empty set, while the union of all clusters should represent
all the observations of dataset D. The next step requires searching a boundary index
value which separates Small Clusters (SC) from the Large Clusters (LC). There are
two ways to calculate this boundary. The first is given by Equation (4.4).
(|C1 | + |C2 | + · · · + |Cb |) ≥ |D | · α (4.4)
An alternative way is to use equation (4.5).
(|Cb | /|Cb+1 |) ≥ β (4.5)
α and β are user-defined parameters in the equations mentioned above. α is be-
tween the range of [0,1] and represents the data comprised by the Large Clusters
(LC). β value should be set to greater than one and defines the lower bound on
relative size among a pair of consecutive clusters. equation (4.4) represents the ap-
proach which separates bigger clusters from the smaller ones by adding the biggest
clusters to LC until some defined part of data is covered. (4.5), on the other hand,
implements the idea that a significant boundary location can be found between LC
and SC among clusters which vary relatively in size. Concisely, it chooses a bound-
ary between two consecutive clusters if the next cluster is β times smaller than the
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previous one. If two equations result in a way that value is different for boundary b,
the smallest value is selected.
After deciding the value of b, the sets LC and SC are created. LC contains all
the clusters with the index equal or smaller to the b and can be represented with
LC = Ci | i ≤ b. Whereas SC consists of the remaining clusters and is represented
by SC = Ci | i > b. Finally, CBLOF scores are calculated for each observation in D
using equation (4.6).
CBLOF(t) =
{
|Ci | ·min
(
dist
(
t,Cj
) )
: t ∈ Ci,Ci ∈ SC and Cj ∈ LC
|Ci | · dist (t,Ci) : t ∈ Ci,Ci ∈ LC
(4.6)
Data points in the large clusters (LC) are estimated as normal observations, and
data points in small clusters (SC) are estimated as anomalous observations. A spe-
cific central point is calculated to represent each cluster and the distance from this
point to each observation in the large cluster defines its anomaly score. A data point
further away from the cluster centre would have a higher chance of being an anomaly,
hence resulting in a higher anomaly score. For the data points not residing inside
large clusters, their anomaly score is calculated based on the nearest data points to
a large cluster. Data points which are far from large clusters end up having even
larger anomaly score. CBLOF computes anomaly score in a similar way than LOF
with the significant difference that distances are calculated with clusters instead of
specific points.
4.4 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Principal component analysis (PCA) is usually considered as a dimensionality re-
duction algorithm. It can manifest variance-covariance of dataset features to create
new variables which are represented by functions of original variables called prin-
cipal components. These principal components are distinct linear combinations of
p number of random variables X1, X2, ... ,Xp. Principal components carry unique
properties such as they are uncorrelated to each other, the variance of components
decreases in descending order representing the first component with the highest vari-
ance and moving to lower variance with every next component. However, the sum
of the total variation in the original features X1, X2, ... ,Xp is always equal to the
total variation of all the principal components combined. Principal components are
trivial to calculate by using eigen analysis of correlation or covariance matrix of data
features.
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Although PCA is usually used for dimensionality reduction, Shyu et al. (2003)
proposed an approach to utilize this algorithm for anomaly detection. If all variables
from the dataset follow the normal distribution, the principal components (PCs) we
compute should be independently normally distributed with their variance equal to
the eigenvalues which we may obtain from single value decomposition. With this
assumption, the algorithm states that
∑p
i=1
PC2i
λi
follows the chi-square distribution
with p degrees of freedom. To detect the anomalies using the PCA algorithm, all
obvious outliers are removed using Mahalanobis distance; this step is carried out
multiple times to remove any data points with very high Mahalanobis distance.
With S as a covariance matrix, xi as an observation of ith feature in data and x as
the mean of all features, Mahalanobis distance D is defined as equation (4.7).
D =
√
(xi − x)T S−1 (xi − x) (4.7)
Further on, principal component analysis is applied to the training dataset, and
their corresponding principal components are computed for the test dataset. Re-
spective major and minor anomaly scores are computed using equation (4.8) and
equation (4.9).
AS1 =
q∑
j=1
PC2j
λ j
(4.8)
AS2 =
p∑
j=p−r+1
PC2j
λ j
(4.9)
Predictions are made using computed anomaly scores. If AS1 ≥ c1 or AS2 ≥ c2
the observation is considered as an anomaly. Whereas if AS1 < c1 or AS2 < c2 the
observation is labelled as a normal data point, where c1 and c2 are outlier thresholds.
This version of PCA detects two types of anomalies: dependency-oriented anomalies
and extreme-value anomalies. Extreme-value anomalies are the data points which
have extreme coordinates in comparison to the data pattern and are detected by
using equation (4.8). Dependency-oriented anomalies are anomalies that are usually
those data points that may have a peculiar correlation among their features and can
be detected using equation (4.9).
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4.5 K-means
In clustering algorithms, K-means is one of the most popular choices for anomaly
detection. It was introduced as an unsupervised learning algorithm by J. MacQueen
(1967). The algorithm aims to partition the data into k different clusters where each
sample belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean. Each cluster is represented by
a centroid c which is the sample mean of observations in that cluster. The similarity
measure used when comparing observations to the cluster is squared Euclidean dis-
tance, which can be computed by using equation (4.10) where xi is the observations
and ci is the centroids and n represents the number of observations.
d2(x, c) =
n∑
i=1
(xi − ci)2 (4.10)
The first step of the process in the K-means algorithm is to initialize the k cen-
troids. Then each observation is iteratively compared with each centroid and as-
signed to it based on the clusters least sum of squares. These assigned observations
ultimately form clusters around the specific centroids. This process is the same as
assigning each observation to its nearest centroid by using Euclidean distance or
squared Euclidean distance as the minimum value for both should be same. This
step in the algorithm is also known as the expectation step.
After each observation is assigned to their nearest centroids and first clusters are
formed, the centroids are updated based on the new sample mean for each cluster.
Centroids can be any arbitrary data point in the cluster representing the mean of
the cluster; it does not have to be any one of the observations. The arithmetic mean
is also minimizing the sum of squares within the clusters. This centroid updating
step is also known as the maximization step.
At the time of termination of the K-means algorithm, results with final centroids
and cluster assignment of all observations are delivered. The algorithm terminates
when centroids have converged, which means the value of centroids stops updating
with more iterations. There is no guarantee that k-means reaches the global optimum
before termination, so it is a common practice to run the algorithm several times on
the data and choose a model with the lowest within-cluster sum of squared distances.
As the mean of each cluster can be any arbitrary data point running the algorithm
every time may produce different solutions that have converged differently, but could
be somewhat similar. If the centroids are initialized near to the local optimum, the
algorithm is likely to converge faster. K-means is a variant of a more generalized
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clustering approach Expectation-Maximization (EM). EM algorithm has a more
probabilistic approach to clustering and creates soft-clusters in contrary to hard-
clusters created by K-means.
Many techniques are proposed to initialize the centroids for fast convergence and
fast termination. However, Arthur and Vassilvitskii (2007) proposed an approach
named k-means++ in which the standard initialization of the centroids is done by
uniformly selecting data points from the dataset. Arthur and Vassilvitskii (2007)
proved in their original paper that standard k-means++ outperforms standard K-
means in convergence time and minimizing within-cluster sum of squared distance.
4.6 Deep Autoencoders
Artificial neural network algorithms are relatively old but have gained popularity
recently due to significant breakthroughs in technology. An autoencoder is a partic-
ular type of artificial neural network that attempts to replicate its input as closely as
possible to its output. Concisely, its an algorithm that can learn a way to regenerate
what is fed to it. J. Zheng and Peng (2018) state in their research that autoen-
coders achieve that by determining the encoding of input data. It allows them to
reconstruct the input data using a computed encoding. As figure 4.3 illustrates the
schematic structure of an autoencoder can be broken into two parts encoder and
decoder.
Figure 4.3. Schematic structure of an autoencoder with 3 fully connected
hidden layers; Commons (2016).
The transition from the first layer X of the network to the middle layer z of the
network represents encoder, and the transition from the middle layer of the network
to the rightmost last layer X’ of the network represents decoder. The first layer of
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an autoencoder neural network is an input layer X, which may consist of m nodes,
the same number of nodes as the dimensions of the data. The middle layer of the
network z may have n nodes, where n represents the dimensions of encoding. The
rightmost layer X’ is the output layer and similar to the input layer shall have
m nodes. As explained by Wang, Yao, and Zhao (2016) autoencoders are usually
used for dimensionality reduction so that the dimensions of the learned encoding is
usually smaller in size than the input.
As stated by the J. Zheng and Peng (2018) equation (4.11) represents the en-
coder e in the autoencoder and equation (4.12) represents the decoder d in the
autoencoder. In the equations below W is an n x n matrix consisting of weights
in the layers of neural network. b is the vector with size n which contains the bias
of the layer and x is the input vector of length n. The σ represents a nonlinear
transformation function such as sigmoid.
e = σ (Wencx + benc) (4.11)
d = σ (Wdece + bdec) (4.12)
Deep autoencoders are neural networks with more complex structures such that
each layer of encoder reduce the dimensions of the input to determine the hidden
encoding behind the data. Vice versa each layer of decoder enlarges the dimensions
until it reaches the input size. Autoencoder is an unsupervised learning algorithm
that can encode and decode data while minimizing the error using the Hecht-Nielsen
(1992) backpropagation algorithm. The reconstruction error is the metric used to
quantify the similarity between the input and output of autoencoder.
To detect anomalies unlabeled data is given to the autoencoder for training, and
it tries to minimize the reconstruction error over the training set. One of the most
common reconstruction errors used is Lehmann and Casella (2006) mean squared
error. Autoencoder tries to fit the model onto the normal dataset without anomalies,
and since the autoencoder has not encountered any anomalies, the reconstruction
should perform better on normal observations than on anomalies. Hence we can
differentiate the anomalies from the standard data by calculating the reconstruction
error. Typically the reconstruction error of an anomaly should be higher than the
reconstruction error of normal observation. A threshold value α can be determined,
which can set the boundary for classifying anomalous observations.
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4.7 Ensemble Classification
Ensemble methods use a diverse combination of various algorithms to make a deci-
sion instead of relying on one. As mentioned by Raschka (2018) a standard method
to combine the predictive power of these algorithms is called majority voting, which
is a democratic solution to determine the final decision. Majority voting method can
be represented by equation (4.13) where we predict yˆ class label via majority voting
of each classifier Cj .
yˆ = mode
{
C1(x),C2(x), . . . ,Cj(x)
}
(4.13)
Another addition to the majority voting technique is that it also allows the as-
sociation of weights with every algorithm making each algorithm’s decision less or
more effective in the final decision. Weighted majority voting can be illustrated by
equation (4.14) here we can compute a weighted majority vote w j by associating it
with classifier Cj .
yˆ = arg max
i
m∑
j=1
w j χA
(
Cj(x) = i
)
(4.14)
Here χA is the characteristic function
[
Cj(x) = i ∈ A
]
, and A is a unique set of
class labels. Raschka (2018) explains another method called soft voting. Soft voting
takes into account decision probabilities p of each classification algorithm to make
a final decision and can be represented by equation (4.15) where w j is the weight
that can be assigned to the j th classifier.
yˆ = arg max
i
m∑
j=1
w j χA
(
Cj(x) = i
)
(4.15)
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5 Frameworks and dataset
This chapter dives into the technologies and frameworks used to conduct experi-
ments1 for this thesis and the life cycle of the blockchain anomaly detection process.
Along with the exploratory analysis illustrations of the data it also explains how the
dataset is constructed and pre-processed for the algorithms to model. This chapter
also explains in detail the evaluation methods utilized for this thesis research.
5.1 Technology and Frameworks
The programming language used to conduct experiments for this thesis is Python
(version 3.6.7). Numerous libraries are used for different purposes to assist experi-
ments. However, the major libraries are as follows:
• Numpy (version 1.17.0): NumPy is the fundamental package for array
computing with Python and used in various computation operations.
• Pandas (version 0.25.0): It offer robust data structures for data analysis
is and used for data handling and manipulation.
• Scikit-Learn (version 0.20.3): Implements various standard machine learn-
ing and model evaluation algorithms such as K-means, ROC Curve, F1-Score
and more.
• Matplotlib (version 3.1.1): Is a plotting package used for visualization
of data.
• Seaborn (version 0.8.1): Is a statistical data visualization tool used for
data visualization.
• Pickle (version 4.0): This module implements binary protocols for seri-
alizing and de-serializing a Python object structure and is used for model
preservation.
• PyOD (version 0.7.2): A Python toolkit for scalable outlier detection
(Anomaly Detection) that implements the majority of anomaly detection al-
gorithms such as HBOS, CBLOF, PCA, Isolation Forest and more.
1https://github.com/epicprojects/blockchain-anomaly-detection
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• Keras (version 2.1.6): Deep learning library that makes implementing
neural networks more comfortable to manage and understand.
• mlxtend (version 0.17.0): Machine learning library extensions used in
this thesis for combining all models for voted ensemble classification.
• NetworkX (version 2.1): Python package for creating and manipulating
graphs and networks used to generate the transaction graph from raw bitcoin
data.
• Hyperopt (version 0.1): Distributed Asynchronous Hyperparameter Op-
timization library used for estimating the best parameters for anomaly detec-
tion algorithms.
• imblearn (version 0.5.0): Toolbox for the imbalanced dataset in machine
learning used in this thesis for synthetic data creation.
• bitcoin-blockchain-parser (version 0.1.4): The library developed by Calvez
(2015) provides a parser for the raw data stored by bitcoind; it was modified
for this thesis and is utilized to read and extract data from raw bitcoin .blk
files.
5.2 Dataset
Raw bitcoin blockchain data is used to create the dataset2 for this thesis. All bitcoin
data was synced from the internet using the bitcoin client software. All the data in
bitcoin blockchain is stored into a public ledger and is represented by the currency
unit called the Bitcoin (BTC). The ledger data contains all the bitcoin transactions
from the beginning of the network creation to now. As recorded by Blockchain.com
(2019) there are approximately 450,000,000 transactions within the bitcoin ledger.
For each transaction, there can be multiple numbers of sender and receiver addresses.
Moreover, a single user can own multiple addresses, and each user is anonymous as
there is no personal information associated with any of the addresses.
The synced raw data from the bitcoin client was filtered out by the year param-
eter to extract a subset. This subset was extracted by writing a python snippet and
represented the data from the year 2011 to 2013, which is approximately 29,000,000
transactions. The reason for selecting this specific range of years is the availability of
2https://ieee-dataport.org/open-access/bitcoin-transaction-network-metadata-2011-2013
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anomalous bitcoin transactions data. Bitcoin Forum (2014) has a comprehensive col-
lection of BTC fraud transactional activity; it has covered details about categories
such as BTC Thefts, BTC Hacks, and BTC Losses, the red-flagged transaction
of interest in each case along with details about the date and how much BTC was
stolen or lost. Data from Bitcoin Forum (2014) was extracted to create an anomalies
dataset3 using a crawler written in python. This thesis used the following technique
to tag malicious transaction while creating the final dataset: all the child transac-
tions of a malicious transaction were also tagged as malicious. So, if someone stole
some bitcoins and that particular transaction was tagged as a malicious activity, all
the further occurring transactions such as transactions moving those stolen bitcoins
elsewhere were also tagged as malicious.
Raw bitcoin data needed to be transformed into a meaningful structure and
labeled using fraudulent transactional cases. The transactional data from the raw
files were parsed to be represented as a directed graph structure. As illustrated by
Reid and Harrigan (2013), the data is logically connected and can be represented as
a transaction network. This transaction network T represents the flow of bitcoins
between transaction throughout a period. Each vertex of this graph may represent
a transaction, and each directed-edge between a source and a destination may rep-
resent details such as the number of bitcoins and timestamp of that transaction.
The directed-edge is initiated from the input of the transaction directing towards
the corresponding target output. Figure 5.1 represents a graphical illustration of a
sub-graph from the transaction graph.
Figure 5.1 shows an example sub-network of network T. Transaction t1 has one
input and two outputs, it was added to the blockchain on 1st May 2011. One output
of t1 is a transfer of 1.2 BTC (Bitcoins) to a user with public-key pk1. The public
keys are not illustrated in the figure 5.1 above. Transaction t2 has two inputs and
two outputs; it was carried out on 5th May 2011. One of the outputs of t2 is the
transfer of 0.12 BTC to a user identified by public-key pk2. t3 transaction has two
inputs and one output it was added to the ledger on 5th May 2011, Inputs of t3
are connected to outputs of t1 and t2 where t3 itself have only one output t4 that
transfers 1.32 BTC on 5th May 2011.
This transaction network graph is represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
and needs to be stored in memory in order to create the data set for anomaly
detection. After experimenting with various storage techniques such as Relational
3https://ieee-dataport.org/open-access/bitcoin-hacked-transactions-2010-2013
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Figure 5.1. An example sub-network from the transaction network. Each
rectangular vertex represents a transaction, and each directed edge represents
a flow of Bitcoins from an output of one transaction to an input of another;
Reid and Harrigan (2013).
Database, Graph Database, and Standard File System, it was determined that the
fastest way to create a DAG was from a standard file system. A comma-separated
value (CSV) dataset4 was created with variables such as input-transaction hash,
output-transaction hash, timestamp, and bitcoin value. Each line of this CSV file
represented at what time and how many bitcoins (BTC) were transferred from the
input-transaction hash to the output-transaction hash. This CSV file was later used
to create an in-memory directed acyclic graph using python NetworkX library.
An in-memory directed acyclic graph (DAG) was created using the previously
generated CSV file. In this DAG each vertex represented a transaction had a certain
number of indegree and outdegree values along with a specific number of bitcoins
(BTC) flowing-in and flowing-out. The DAG was traversed to extract the features
and incorporate them into a dataset. The following features were extracted from the
DAG to create a final dataset for anomaly detection.
• In-degree: Number of transactions from which a given transaction receives
money.
• Out-degree: Number of transactions that a given transaction gives money
to.
• In-BTC: Number of bitcoins on each incoming edge to a given transaction.
4https://ieee-dataport.org/open-access/bitcoin-transactions-data-2011-2013
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• Out-BTC: Number of bitcoins on each outgoing edge from a given transac-
tion.
• Total-BTC: Net number of bitcoins for a given transaction considering all
in- and out-going edges from that transaction.
• Average in-BTC: Average number of bitcoins on each incoming edge to a
given transaction.
• Average out-BTC: Average number of bitcoins on each outgoing edge from
a given transaction.
• Is-Anomaly: Status of a given transaction if it is malicious or not.
While traversing the DAG, each transaction was also labeled as either anomalous
or non-anomalous resulting in a final dataset consisting of metadata extracted from
the DAG. The final dataset had around 30 million normal non-malicious transactions
and 108 malicious transactions. It is to be noticed that the data is highly imbalanced,
and it is challenging to create a robust model for anomaly detection. Not all anomaly
detection algorithms are capable of handling such a massive amount of data, so for
some algorithms, a specific number of sub-samples were modeled and compared
to find the best fitting model. Also Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique
(SMOTE) was used to perform over-sampling over the class of malicious transactions
in order to have more training instances for modeling. However, only non-synthetic
data was used to test the model.
5.3 Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)
Exploratory analysis of the data includes various visualizations that help understand
the data and the relationship among its dimensions in a more in-depth manner. It
also helped in detecting class imbalance within data as well as it feature’s correlation.
The exploratory analysis also helped in understanding what kind of transformation
can be applied on data to prepare it before modeling.
Exploratory data analysis revealed some insights into the data. As also mentioned
in previous section, the class distribution of the dataset is highly imbalanced with
30,248,026 non-malicious data points and only 108 malicious transactions, make
malicious transactions to be only approximately 0.00035% of whole data. A fre-
quency histogram illustrates it in figure 5.2 where x-axis of the plot represents a
non-malicious class with ’0’ and malicious class with ’1’ and the y-axis represents
38
the frequency of classes. The y-axis of the histogram was log-scaled for better visual
representation.
Figure 5.2. A frequency histogram of the extracted bitcoin transactional data
representing distribution of malicious and non-malicious transactions in the
dataset.
Distributions of all variables were plotted to have a visual sense of the data;
e.g. if it is skewed and requires any transformation or normalization. Figure 5.3
illustrates the data in a grid of distribution histograms. Each histogram represents
a single feature of the dataset and its respective data distribution. For the visual
representation, both x-axis and y-axis were log-scaled. We can see in Figure 5.3 that
all variables of the data highly follow a right-skewed distribution. This skewness of
data can cause difficulty in the modeling process. Transformations to reduce the
right-skewness of the data include square root, cube root, and log. According to this
thesis’s experiments, a Log function transformation seems to have a positive effect
on the data. However, according to the table 5.1, our data contains of zero values,
and standard log transformation cannot be applied to it. Table 5.1 also describes
other statistics of the data such as mean, standard deviation, min value and max
value for each feature of the dataset before the transformation.
Indegree Outdegree In-BTC Out-BTC Total-BTC Mean-in-BTC Mean-out-BTC
mean 2.149 2.149 54.842 54.842 109.683 49.240 28.771
std 7.421 4.512 1303.303 1301.473 2602.527 972.921 712.557
min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 1932 1322.000 550000 500020.7 1050000 499259.58 500000
Table 5.1. Untransformed data statistics.
Since standard log transformation cannot be applied to the data, on several ex-
periments a log(x+1) transformation was applied along with ’Robust Scaler’ trans-
formation. The purpose of the robust scaler transformation is to standardize the
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Figure 5.3. A frequency histogram of the extracted bitcoin transactional data
representing distribution of malicious and non-malicious transactions in the
dataset.
data by removing the median and scaling the data according to the Interquartile
Range (IQR) between the 1st quartile (25th quantile) and the 3rd quartile (75th
quantile). Scaling and standardization is applied to each feature independently and
is achieved by computing relevant statistics. Standardization is a common require-
ment of several machine learning algorithms. Usually, it is achieved by removing
the mean and scaling to the unit variance. However, in the case of outliers, sample
mean and variance can be influenced negatively, hence affecting final results. In such
cases, interquartile range and median can often give better results, and that is the
motivation behind particularly choosing the robust scaler.
40
After the normalization and standardization transformations have been applied,
the features of the data are observed to be less skewed than before. Moreover, the
data is in a more reasonable range, and all the units of the variables have been
standardized. This pre-processing step can help various machine learning estimators
to perform better. However, the data is still skewed to some level and may cause
complexity when modeled. Figure 5.4 illustrates the data distribution histograms
after the transformation was applied. Table 5.2 describes statistics of the transformed
data.
Figure 5.4. Frequency distribution histograms of the transformed data.
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Indegree Outdegree In-BTC Out-BTC Total-BTC Mean-in-BTC Mean-out-BTC
mean 0.613 -0.026 0.312 0.307 0.230 0.408 0.395
std 1.138 0.268 0.729 0.717 0.648 0.831 0.836
min -1.710 -1.099 -0.304 -0.304 -0.391 -0.235 -0.240
max 16.953 6.089 5.799 5.623 4.599 6.946 7.668
Table 5.2. Transformed data statistics.
Correlation matrices are one of the essential factors of understanding data. They
can aid us in determining if the features heavily influence a specific transaction to
be malicious. Both extremely positive or negative correlation can reveal a feature’s
ability to affect maliciousness. To make sure that high data imbalance does not af-
fect feature correlation, a second correlation matrix for a random subsample with
balanced classes is also created and analyzed. Figure 5.5 visualizes the correlation
matrix for complete data, whereas Figure 5.6 illustrates the correlation matrix for a
balanced class random sub-sample. Based on both correlation matrices, we can say
that indegree and outdegree exhibit negative correlation with maliciousness. The
lower these correlation values are, the more likely the result will be a fraud trans-
action. On the contrary the features in btc, out btc, mean in btc, mean out btc
and total btc exhibit positive correlation. The higher these values are, the more
likely the end result will be a fraud transaction. Strong blue color represent high
correlation values, strong red color represent low correlation values, and all shades
in between show values varying in between.
Figure 5.5. Correlation matrix visualization of complete data.
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Figure 5.6. Correlation matrix visualization of class balanced random sub-
sample.
Pair plots are a powerful tool that can help in data distribution exploration and
uncovering relationships among data dimensions. It provides a comprehensive first
glance at the data visually that can lead to further analysis decisions. Figure 5.7
shows a 7 x 7 grid structure in which each x-axis variable represents a relationship
plot with each y-axis variable. The diagonal of this grid shows a histogram for each
variable, thus depicting their distributions. The legend of the plot on middle-right
helps in understanding the data-points. All blue data points in the pair plots rep-
resent normal non-malicious transactions whereas all red data points in the pair
plots represent malicious transactions which are marked as fraudulent. As observed
from Figure 5.7, there is a visible pattern of malicious transaction in-between sev-
eral variable relationships. This pair plot is based on a complete data set consisting
of approximately 30 million transactions. However, as mentioned in previous sub-
sections, the data was normalized and standardized for better visual representation.
This thesis aims to learn and estimate models of the patterns visible in the multiple
pairwise bivariate distributions plot. Due to computation and storage scope limita-
tions, previously known studies have not computed this many variables to extract a
pattern. As seen in the illustration, the data is highly non-linear and would require
a complex representation to learn.
This chapter also describes the implementation and results for all the research
experiments for this thesis. It explains the metrics that are used to evaluate the
results. Due to the nature of this research, multiple evaluation techniques were
required in accordance with their respective algorithms and limitations.
In all experiments for this thesis, data is passed through a pipeline, which per-
forms filtration, normalization, and scaling transformation over data to prepare it for
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modeling. Although this experiment is treated as an unsupervised activity, the data
is divided into a training set and a test set for evaluation purposes. The training set
for isolation forest contains 80% of the data and consists of 24,198,425 non-malicious
data points and 82 malicious data points. The test set contains 20% of the data and
consists of 6,049,601 non-malicious data points and 26 malicious data points.
Figure 5.7. Pair-plot grid between all feature variables visualizing the pat-
terns of malicious and non-malicious transactions. The legend on middle-right
describes the data point classes.
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5.4 Evaluation Metrics
This sub-section explains various evaluation metrics that are utilized in this thesis.
Due to the high class-imbalance nature of the data in this thesis, conventional eval-
uation techniques are not applicable. However, various state-of-the-art evaluation
metrics such as confusion matrix, recall, precision, accuracy, and more in combina-
tion a fair evaluation.
A confusion matrix C is a matrix that represents the error of a classification
problem C i j such that C i j is equal to the number of observations belonging to
group i but predicted to be in group j. In a binary classification scenario, the count of
C 0,0, True Negatives (TN), represents observations that were negative and predicted
negative. C 1,1, True Positives (TP), is the count of positive observations that were
predicted positive. C 0,1, False Positives (FP), is the count of observations which
were negative but predicted positive, and C 1,0, False Negatives (FN), is the count of
negative observations predicted positive. Data from a confusion matrix can be used
to compute various evaluation scores for a model, such as accuracy, precision, and
recall.
Micro average metrics are sustainable to use when dataset classes vary in size
and macro average metrics when it is vital to determine how the system performs
overall all classes of data. For this thesis research, we want to determine the over-
all performance of the system across both malicious and non-malicious classes, so
macro average metrics are primarily used. Micro average metrics in sum up True
Positives (TP), False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN) for different classes
individually to obtain statistics. Whereas macro average metrics are straight forward
and compute the average of statistics, i.e., recall, precision on different classes of the
data. Macro evaluation metrics are explained in more detail below.
Accuracy is an intuitive performance measure that computes the ratio between
predicted observations and total observations and can be calculated by TP+TNTP+FP+FN+TN .
It gives a general idea about how well a model is trained, however for imbalanced
datasets it does not perform well and can be deceiving. Balanced accuracy, on the
other hand, is a more practical approach to calculate the accuracy of a model when
data is imbalanced. Balanced accuracy is defined as the average of recall score R
obtained on each class and can be defined as equation 5.1.
balanced accuracy =
1
C
C∑
j=1
Rj (5.1)
45
The ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to the total predicted posi-
tive observations is called precision and can be computed using TPTP+FP . Whereas for
C classes, the macro precision score can be described as equation 5.2 in which TP j
and FP j represent true positives and false positives of each class label j.
macro precision =
1
C
C∑
j=1
TPj
TPj + FPj
(5.2)
Recall score is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to all the
observations in the actual positive class and can be computed by TPTP+FN . Macro
recall score for C classes is defined as equation 5.3 in which TP j represents true
positives and FN j represents false negatives for each class label j.
macro recall =
1
C
C∑
j=1
TPj
TPj + FNj
(5.3)
A weighted average of precision and recall is defined as F-Score, it can also be
described as a harmonic mean of precision and recall and can be calculated by
2×(Precision×Recall)
Precision+Recall . As equation 5.4 depicts, macro-f1 score is the harmonic mean
between precision P j and recall R j .
macro F1 =
1
C
C∑
j=1
2 × Pj × Rj
Pj + Rj
(5.4)
A receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) is a visual illustration of diag-
nostic ability for a classifier as its discrimination threshold is varied. A ROC curve
is created by plotting a graph between true positive rate (TPR) and false positive
rate (FPR) at different threshold settings. True positive rate (TPR) is known as
sensitivity or probability of detecting the right answer. Whereas the false positive
rate (FPR) is known as fall-out or the probability of false-alarm of an algorithm.
In a machine learning problem ROC curves play the role of figuring out how good
the model is. The area under the curve (AUC) of a receiver operating characteristic
curve (ROC) estimates a score that describes the model performance. Higher the
AUC the better the performance of the model.
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6 Research Results
This chapter explains the evaluation results for all algorithms and how they were ob-
tained. Various evaluation metrics explained in section 5.4 were used to perform the
assessment. Due to the vast amount of data, the time complexity for some algorithms
was enormous. However, to tackle the problem, we randomly subsampled 1/10th of
the training data and fit 20 different models with fine-tuned hyper-parameters. Pa-
rameters such as sub-sampling 1/10th of data and training exactly 20 models were
calculated based on experiments and the values were finalized when the model’s
performance stopped changing even when the sample size or the number of models
were increased.
6.1 Isolation Forest
To handle the extreme class imbalance, Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique
(SMOTE) is utilized to generate more synthetic malicious training samples so that
the algorithm can detect a pattern of anomalies within the data more efficiently. The
ratio for newly generated synthetic data points is also estimated by hyper-parameter
optimization. All hyper-parameters are optimized by minimizing a loss function.
For this research case, the loss function chosen is the complement of the Macro F1
score. Optimized parameters estimated for isolation forest are 40 N-estimators and a
0.057 contamination/oversampling fraction. All trained models are evaluated using
a single test set, which contains non-synthetic data unseen by all models. Table
6.1 describes the evaluation metrics for training data, and the table 6.2 describes
evaluation metrics for test data.
Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
16 0.944288 0.733215 0.727564 0.733215 0.730347 0.877941 0.483863 0.496625 0.490161 0.877941 93.2479
4 0.942917 0.733721 0.721837 0.733721 0.727591 0.880167 0.47231 0.499235 0.4854 0.880167 72.8744
14 0.942915 0.733703 0.721827 0.733703 0.727577 0.873728 0.472292 0.499199 0.485373 0.873728 93.8357
19 0.942477 0.731424 0.719772 0.731424 0.725416 0.877053 0.468431 0.494856 0.481281 0.877053 92.8283
1 0.942361 0.73098 0.719247 0.73098 0.724928 0.869639 0.467428 0.494044 0.480368 0.869639 93.6913
5 0.942357 0.730625 0.719188 0.730625 0.72473 0.869266 0.46735 0.493297 0.479973 0.869266 72.6013
10 0.941957 0.729012 0.71737 0.729012 0.723007 0.874808 0.463887 0.490325 0.47674 0.874808 96.4204
15 0.941899 0.728732 0.717102 0.728732 0.722733 0.874072 0.46338 0.489796 0.476222 0.874072 93.914
7 0.94167 0.727586 0.716033 0.727586 0.721626 0.864868 0.461366 0.487621 0.47413 0.864868 93.7485
6 0.941509 0.726762 0.715279 0.726762 0.720839 0.875373 0.459948 0.486055 0.472641 0.875373 93.6141
2 0.941547 0.726146 0.715344 0.726146 0.720584 0.865821 0.460149 0.484706 0.472109 0.865821 72.668
17 0.941373 0.726154 0.714654 0.726154 0.720221 0.87482 0.458764 0.484916 0.471478 0.87482 93.1396
11 0.941423 0.72565 0.714784 0.72565 0.720054 0.870189 0.459083 0.483793 0.471114 0.870189 93.635
20 0.941322 0.725891 0.714414 0.725891 0.71997 0.856564 0.458313 0.484416 0.471003 0.856564 94.1311
12 0.941231 0.725456 0.713992 0.725456 0.719542 0.874049 0.457515 0.483597 0.470195 0.874049 93.3739
3 0.940597 0.722353 0.711047 0.722353 0.71652 0.870303 0.45196 0.477724 0.464485 0.870303 72.3175
18 0.940241 0.720592 0.709387 0.720592 0.714812 0.872835 0.448832 0.474389 0.461257 0.872835 94.9744
9 0.940137 0.719327 0.708781 0.719327 0.713896 0.863974 0.447761 0.471823 0.459477 0.863974 93.7041
13 0.939583 0.71738 0.706329 0.71738 0.711678 0.856531 0.443063 0.468314 0.455338 0.856531 93.4076
8 0.939272 0.715797 0.704871 0.715797 0.71016 0.866576 0.440319 0.465305 0.452467 0.866576 93.4799
Table 6.1. Isolation forest training data evaluation metrics table.
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Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
16 0.969937 0.792662 0.500043 0.792662 0.492457 0.905661 0.000088 0.615385 0.000176 0.905661 253.7361
4 0.968476 0.772701 0.500038 0.772701 0.492071 0.906247 0.000079 0.576923 0.000157 0.906247 198.8027
14 0.968226 0.791806 0.500041 0.791806 0.492012 0.91488 0.000083 0.615385 0.000166 0.91488 256.5248
19 0.968024 0.791705 0.50004 0.791705 0.491959 0.907029 0.000083 0.615385 0.000165 0.907029 253.1945
1 0.968016 0.77247 0.500038 0.77247 0.491952 0.912436 0.000077 0.576923 0.000155 0.912436 211.0259
5 0.967912 0.791649 0.50004 0.791649 0.49193 0.904008 0.000082 0.615385 0.000165 0.904008 221.3265
10 0.967791 0.791589 0.50004 0.791589 0.491898 0.911635 0.000082 0.615385 0.000164 0.911635 257.2346
7 0.967748 0.791567 0.50004 0.791567 0.491887 0.915841 0.000082 0.615385 0.000164 0.915841 255.7002
11 0.967697 0.791542 0.50004 0.791542 0.491874 0.905725 0.000082 0.615385 0.000164 0.905725 250.2062
2 0.967673 0.753068 0.500035 0.753068 0.491857 0.913306 0.000072 0.538462 0.000143 0.913306 201.7576
15 0.967632 0.791509 0.50004 0.791509 0.491856 0.910965 0.000082 0.615385 0.000163 0.910965 252.4534
6 0.967486 0.752975 0.500035 0.752975 0.491808 0.907191 0.000071 0.538462 0.000142 0.907191 254.02
12 0.967365 0.791376 0.50004 0.791376 0.491787 0.907348 0.000081 0.615385 0.000162 0.907348 256.3384
17 0.967353 0.791369 0.50004 0.791369 0.491784 0.8967 0.000081 0.615385 0.000162 0.8967 265.3844
20 0.967294 0.772109 0.500037 0.772109 0.491763 0.897381 0.000076 0.576923 0.000152 0.897381 256.608
3 0.967267 0.752865 0.500034 0.752865 0.491751 0.903518 0.000071 0.538462 0.000141 0.903518 208.0658
9 0.96672 0.752592 0.500034 0.752592 0.491609 0.911368 0.000069 0.538462 0.000139 0.911368 255.3841
18 0.966661 0.752562 0.500034 0.752562 0.491593 0.913511 0.000069 0.538462 0.000139 0.913511 256.8337
8 0.966291 0.771608 0.500036 0.771608 0.491502 0.906655 0.000074 0.576923 0.000147 0.906655 261.235
13 0.966268 0.790827 0.500038 0.790827 0.491501 0.900982 0.000078 0.615385 0.000157 0.900982 256.0704
Table 6.2. Isolation forest test data evaluation metrics table.
Both tables described above are descendingly rearranged according to the Macro-
F1 score. The reason behind this sort is to highlight which models have higher
precision and recall in combination. The first row of the table shows the best model
according to the selected criterion. The time in the tables is measured in seconds,
table 6.1 time represents the training time per particular model and table 6.2 repre-
sents the evaluation time per particular model when evaluating the test set. Below
are visual plots of various evaluation metrics for isolation forest to understand the
results in a detailed manner.
Figure 6.1. Time elapsed for training and validating each model.
Selecting a model based on these evaluation metrics is challenging; however, for
this thesis, the Macro-F1 metric is selected as the baseline as we are interested in
the optimized precision and recall combination of a model. By analyzing the visual
illustrations and based on the highest macro-f1 metric and a fairly reasonable ROC
curve and other evaluation metrics, iteration 16 is favourable.
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Figure 6.2. Training and validation balanced accuracy metric for each model.
Figure 6.3. Training and validation macro F1 score metric for each model.
Figure 6.4. Training and validation macro precision score metric for each
model.
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Figure 6.5. Training and validation macro recall score metric for each model.
Figure 6.6. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for each model.
Figure 6.7. Training and validation precision versus recall trade-off for iter-
ation 16.
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Figure 6.8. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for iteration 16.
Confusion matrix gives an overall view of the classifer evaluation. Confusion met-
rics in figure 6.9 represent the classification evaluation in percentage format. Based
on figure 6.9 it can be determined that 62% (16 out of 26) of the malicious transac-
tions were correctly detected and equally important 97% (5,867,741 out of 6,049,601)
of non-malicious transactions were also correctly classified as normal transactions.
Figure 6.9. Training and validation percentage confusion matrix for iteration
16.
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6.2 Histogram-based Outlier Score (HBOS)
As Goldstein and Dengel (2012) describe Histogram based outlier score (HBOS) is
not so sensitive to the massive volume of data. The computation time for HBOS
can be reasonable with large quantity of training data. However, to be fair about
results comparisons with other algorithms, the training data is randomly subsam-
pled into 20 chunks, and each chunk contains 1/10th of the data with substantial
malicious data points. Chawla et al. (2002), Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Tech-
nique (SMOTE) is used to partially balance the class imbalance so the algorithm can
search for a recognizable pattern. All hyper-parameters, including the over-sampling
ratio, are estimated by the hyper-parameter tuning process. Best hyper-parameters
are chosen based on the maximization of the macro-F1 metric. HBOS is estimated
to give best results when trained with 8 N-bins, 0.714 alpha, 0.379 tol, and 0.249
contamination/oversampling ratio.
Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
15 0.85746 0.794962 0.77553 0.794962 0.784471 0.880219 0.629901 0.691021 0.659047 0.880219 1.1888
13 0.857261 0.794398 0.775246 0.794398 0.784068 0.880203 0.629603 0.689851 0.658351 0.880203 1.1697
12 0.856922 0.79378 0.774752 0.79378 0.78352 0.878854 0.628883 0.688767 0.657464 0.878854 1.1653
1 0.857022 0.793258 0.774919 0.793258 0.783397 0.879194 0.62954 0.687212 0.657113 0.879194 1.3421
5 0.85636 0.792043 0.773952 0.792043 0.782321 0.877926 0.62813 0.685076 0.655368 0.877926 1.1901
3 0.856291 0.792042 0.773846 0.792042 0.782259 0.877456 0.627903 0.685189 0.655296 0.877456 1.4542
14 0.847649 0.799336 0.762194 0.799336 0.777689 0.878736 0.59807 0.718987 0.652978 0.878736 1.1607
2 0.847627 0.798635 0.762111 0.798635 0.777398 0.877766 0.598315 0.717155 0.652367 0.877766 1.1706
4 0.845629 0.801872 0.759972 0.801872 0.77694 0.8776 0.591544 0.729101 0.653158 0.8776 1.3222
8 0.847228 0.798301 0.761586 0.798301 0.776929 0.877681 0.597354 0.716931 0.651702 0.877681 1.2399
6 0.84513 0.800333 0.75922 0.800333 0.77593 0.878612 0.590828 0.72583 0.651408 0.878612 1.1679
16 0.84524 0.7996 0.759276 0.7996 0.775741 0.878875 0.591409 0.723696 0.650899 0.878875 1.1703
20 0.844928 0.799925 0.758937 0.799925 0.775602 0.878035 0.590449 0.725081 0.650876 0.878035 1.1645
7 0.844992 0.799756 0.758996 0.799756 0.775592 0.877757 0.590688 0.724524 0.650796 0.877757 1.1771
9 0.84463 0.799311 0.758519 0.799311 0.775114 0.87831 0.589899 0.72394 0.650082 0.87831 1.2939
11 0.844504 0.799141 0.758352 0.799141 0.774943 0.875388 0.589632 0.723696 0.649821 0.875388 1.1674
17 0.843229 0.800405 0.757 0.800405 0.77435 0.878977 0.58581 0.729186 0.649682 0.878977 1.161
10 0.843886 0.79839 0.757539 0.79839 0.774131 0.874236 0.588284 0.722726 0.648612 0.874236 1.1543
19 0.842464 0.798853 0.755933 0.798853 0.773114 0.875649 0.584397 0.726325 0.647677 0.875649 1.3274
18 0.842004 0.798031 0.755303 0.798031 0.772412 0.874614 0.583505 0.724899 0.646562 0.874614 1.1794
Table 6.3. Histogram based outlier score (HBOS) training data evaluation
metrics table.
Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
5 0.899034 0.814902 0.500015 0.814902 0.473448 0.913777 0.000031 0.730769 0.000062 0.913777 2.7831
3 0.899026 0.814898 0.500015 0.814898 0.473445 0.913763 0.000031 0.730769 0.000062 0.913763 2.4839
1 0.899022 0.814896 0.500015 0.814896 0.473444 0.913857 0.000031 0.730769 0.000062 0.913857 4.4509
15 0.898753 0.814762 0.500015 0.814762 0.47337 0.91402 0.000031 0.730769 0.000062 0.91402 2.6611
12 0.898675 0.814723 0.500015 0.814723 0.473348 0.913601 0.000031 0.730769 0.000062 0.913601 2.5596
13 0.89866 0.814715 0.500015 0.814715 0.473343 0.91819 0.000031 0.730769 0.000062 0.91819 2.564
2 0.880192 0.843942 0.500014 0.843942 0.468168 0.912984 0.000029 0.807692 0.000058 0.912984 2.5366
8 0.879901 0.843797 0.500014 0.843797 0.468086 0.913079 0.000029 0.807692 0.000058 0.913079 2.5057
14 0.879889 0.843791 0.500014 0.843791 0.468083 0.913121 0.000029 0.807692 0.000058 0.913121 3.0518
16 0.87542 0.803095 0.500012 0.803095 0.466811 0.910772 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.910772 2.5402
4 0.87469 0.80273 0.500012 0.80273 0.466603 0.912464 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.912464 2.492
9 0.874591 0.80268 0.500012 0.80268 0.466575 0.910173 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.910173 2.4895
7 0.874567 0.802668 0.500012 0.802668 0.466568 0.910708 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.910708 2.5446
20 0.874507 0.802638 0.500012 0.802638 0.466551 0.910553 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.910553 2.533
6 0.874503 0.802636 0.500012 0.802636 0.46655 0.910531 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.910531 2.5219
11 0.874265 0.802518 0.500012 0.802518 0.466483 0.910078 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.910078 2.5244
10 0.87421 0.80249 0.500012 0.80249 0.466467 0.910108 0.000025 0.730769 0.00005 0.910108 2.4964
18 0.871317 0.839505 0.500013 0.839505 0.465644 0.912691 0.000027 0.807692 0.000054 0.912691 2.513
17 0.871294 0.839493 0.500013 0.839493 0.465637 0.913317 0.000027 0.807692 0.000054 0.913317 2.5208
19 0.871152 0.839422 0.500013 0.839422 0.465597 0.912713 0.000027 0.807692 0.000054 0.912713 2.5259
Table 6.4. Histogram based outlier score (HBOS) test data evaluation metrics
table.
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Table 6.3 describes the metrics obtained from evaluating the training data for
each model, whereas the table 6.4 describes evaluation results from the test set for
each model. Both tables are sorted in a descending manner based on the macro-
F1 score, and time complexity is measured in seconds. Based on training evaluation
metrics, iteration 15 performs better, but on the other hand based on test evaluation
metrics, iteration 5 seems to have more noticeable results. Upon more in-depth
analysis, it is observed that the gap between both the evaluation model is minor
as compared to other models. The trade-off of macro-f1 score and area under the
curve (AUC) for receiver operating characteristic (ROC) has to be balanced along
with other metrics while choosing an optimal model. Therefore based on the plots
iteration 17 is chosen as the baseline model. Training time and evaluation time for
the histogram-based outlier score (HBOS) is comparatively shorter for the isolation
forest algorithm. However, increasing the training set size for each iteration has not
caused a significant impact on the overall performance of the models.
Figure 6.10. Time elapsed for training and validating each model.
Figure 6.11. Training and validation balanced accuracy metric for each
model.
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Figure 6.12. Training and validation macro F1 score metric for each model.
Figure 6.13. Training and validation macro precision score metric for each
model.
Figure 6.14. Training and validation macro recall score metric for each
model.
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Figure 6.15. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for each model.
Visual illustrations below are a deeper dive into the selected model, which is
of iteration 17. The validation receiver operating characteristic (ROC) has per-
formed significantly better than training receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
for histogram-based outlier score (HBOS). Finding the optimal threshold for the
model is a challenging task and requires extensive research and experimentation of
its own. Nevertheless, this library used by this thesis to detect anomalies has a built-
in algorithm, which optimally selects the threshold with the best possible results.
Figure 6.16 shows interesting behaviour near high threshold values, the model ini-
tially starts going towards underfitting and then after that toward overfitting. This
happens due the increasing value of threshold with respect to the model evaluation.
Figure 6.16. Training and validation precision versus recall trade-off for
iteration 17.
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Figure 6.17. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for iteration 17.
Confusion matrix for histogram-based outlier score (HBOS) revealed that al-
though 81% (21 out of 26) of malicious transactions were detected successfully and
87% (5,270,982 out of 6,049,601) of non-malicious transactions were also detected
correctly in the test set, also the false-positive rate was a fairly moderate which
is 19% (5 out of 26) for this algorithm. For both training and test evaluation, the
model seems to perform with moderate false positives and false negatives. Although
the significance of performance metrics is wholly based on the use-case, this thesis
in an ideal use-case ultimately aims to maximize the detection of true positives and
true negatives while minimizing the false positives.
Figure 6.18. Training and validation percentage confusion matrix for itera-
tion 17.
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6.3 Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF)
He, Xu, and Deng (2003) describe Cluster-based local outlier factor (CBLOF) is
sensitive to the massive data volumes. The computation time for CBLOF can be
enormous with a large quantity of training data. However, to overcome that, the
training data is randomly subsampled into 20 subsets and each subset contains
1/10th of the data.
Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
3 0.800226 0.721385 0.689702 0.721385 0.702203 0.758768 0.480692 0.593944 0.531351 0.758768 47.9858
15 0.79995 0.720938 0.689319 0.720938 0.701793 0.758496 0.480108 0.593221 0.530704 0.758496 45.6294
12 0.799946 0.720931 0.689313 0.720931 0.701786 0.75838 0.480098 0.593209 0.530693 0.75838 47.363
6 0.799931 0.720907 0.689292 0.720907 0.701764 0.757914 0.480066 0.593171 0.530659 0.757914 46.7367
7 0.79982 0.720727 0.689138 0.720727 0.701598 0.758771 0.479831 0.592879 0.530398 0.758771 41.7685
19 0.799788 0.720676 0.689094 0.720676 0.701551 0.758266 0.479764 0.592797 0.530324 0.758266 46.5725
17 0.79978 0.720662 0.689082 0.720662 0.701538 0.758066 0.479745 0.592774 0.530304 0.758066 49.5699
1 0.799772 0.720649 0.689071 0.720649 0.701527 0.757941 0.479729 0.592753 0.530285 0.757941 49.8873
13 0.79976 0.72063 0.689055 0.72063 0.701508 0.758434 0.479703 0.592722 0.530257 0.758434 43.0998
4 0.799732 0.720584 0.689016 0.720584 0.701467 0.758568 0.479643 0.592648 0.530191 0.758568 39.1775
11 0.799678 0.720497 0.688941 0.720497 0.701387 0.758337 0.47953 0.592507 0.530065 0.758337 44.2574
9 0.799612 0.720389 0.688849 0.720389 0.701288 0.75799 0.479389 0.592332 0.529909 0.75799 38.8703
14 0.799536 0.720268 0.688744 0.720268 0.701175 0.757593 0.479229 0.592136 0.529733 0.757593 39.4134
16 0.799524 0.720248 0.688728 0.720248 0.701157 0.757786 0.479203 0.592104 0.529705 0.757786 42.8584
20 0.799517 0.720236 0.688717 0.720236 0.701147 0.75754 0.479188 0.592085 0.529687 0.75754 41.345
5 0.799494 0.720199 0.688686 0.720199 0.701113 0.757807 0.479139 0.592025 0.529634 0.757807 41.228
18 0.799475 0.720166 0.688659 0.720166 0.701083 0.757947 0.479099 0.591969 0.529587 0.757947 39.2051
10 0.799406 0.720057 0.688564 0.720057 0.700982 0.757733 0.478953 0.591795 0.529428 0.757733 41.2255
2 0.797079 0.716287 0.685334 0.716287 0.697513 0.760188 0.474015 0.585693 0.523969 0.760188 46.7029
8 0.795934 0.714432 0.683744 0.714432 0.695806 0.763466 0.471584 0.58269 0.521283 0.763466 47.5644
Table 6.5. Cluster-based local outlier factor (CBLOF) training data evalua-
tion metrics table.
Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
7 0.848902 0.789836 0.50001 0.789836 0.459159 0.818955 0.000021 0.730769 0.000042 0.818955 4.8076
13 0.848684 0.789727 0.50001 0.789727 0.459095 0.81956 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.81956 4.8853
6 0.848673 0.789721 0.50001 0.789721 0.459092 0.81903 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.81903 5.0782
4 0.848649 0.789709 0.50001 0.789709 0.459085 0.818928 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.818928 4.835
17 0.848617 0.789694 0.50001 0.789694 0.459076 0.819533 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819533 4.8359
12 0.848572 0.789671 0.50001 0.789671 0.459063 0.819083 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819083 4.7862
9 0.848565 0.789667 0.50001 0.789667 0.45906 0.819022 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819022 4.9408
5 0.848348 0.789559 0.50001 0.789559 0.458997 0.81927 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.81927 4.8933
1 0.848344 0.789557 0.50001 0.789557 0.458996 0.819057 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819057 5.1392
15 0.848343 0.789556 0.50001 0.789556 0.458995 0.819055 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819055 4.814
19 0.848323 0.789547 0.50001 0.789547 0.45899 0.819824 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819824 5.2029
14 0.848322 0.789546 0.50001 0.789546 0.458989 0.819066 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819066 4.9586
11 0.848317 0.789544 0.50001 0.789544 0.458988 0.819092 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819092 5.2527
10 0.848304 0.789537 0.50001 0.789537 0.458984 0.819079 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819079 4.9892
3 0.848294 0.789532 0.50001 0.789532 0.458981 0.819352 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819352 5.0132
18 0.848213 0.789491 0.50001 0.789491 0.458957 0.818937 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.818937 4.8327
20 0.848201 0.789485 0.50001 0.789485 0.458954 0.819166 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819166 4.937
16 0.848077 0.789423 0.50001 0.789423 0.458918 0.819653 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.819653 4.9704
2 0.8468 0.788785 0.50001 0.788785 0.458543 0.824439 0.000021 0.730769 0.000041 0.824439 4.9829
8 0.845836 0.788303 0.500009 0.788303 0.45826 0.848228 0.00002 0.730769 0.000041 0.848228 4.9508
Table 6.6. Cluster-based local outlier factor (CBLOF) test data evaluation
metrics table.
Each training subset is oversampled with substantial malicious data points by
using the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE). The estimated
optimal hyper-parameters computed for CBLOF are 8 N-clusters, 0.2356 contam-
ination, and outliers fraction with 0.839 alpha and 2 beta. Based on descriptive
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Figure 6.19. Time elapsed for training and validating each model.
Figure 6.20. Training and validation balanced accuracy metric for each
model.
Figure 6.21. Training and validation macro F1 score metric for each model.
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Figure 6.22. Training and validation macro precision score metric for each
model.
Figure 6.23. Training and validation macro recall score metric for each
model.
Figure 6.24. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for each model.
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tables and evaluation visualizations above, iteration 7 is selected as the CBLOF
base model.
Figure 6.25. Training and validation precision versus recall trade-off for
iteration 7.
Figure 6.26. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for iteration 7.
The confusion matrix below for cluster-based local outlier factor (CBLOF) shows
that the algorithm performs well. The overall results with 73% (19 out of 26) success-
ful detection of malicious data points along with 85% (5,135,522 out of 6,049,601)
of successful detection of non-malicious data points are satisfactory. Only 27% (7
out of 26) false-positive cases were identified in the test set which is also adequate
for this use-case.
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Figure 6.27. Training and validation percentage confusion matrix for itera-
tion 7.
6.4 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Jolliffe (2011) explain Principal component analysis (PCA) is sensitive to the massive
data volumes. But for our training data the computation time for PCA is reasonable.
However, to have a fair evaluation comparison, training data is randomly subsampled
into 20 subsets where each subset is the size of 1/10th of the total data. Table
6.7 and table 6.8 below describe the evaluation metrics for training and test data.
Each training subset was partially balanced with malicious data points by using
the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE). The estimated optimal
hyper-parameters computed for PCA are 3 N-components with outliers-fraction of
0.240 and tol value of 0.5. Based on descriptive tables and evaluation visualizations
below, iteration 19 is selected as the PCA base model.
Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
19 0.855803 0.814644 0.769254 0.814644 0.787675 0.893438 0.602815 0.747491 0.667403 0.893438 5.5105
5 0.855719 0.814511 0.76914 0.814511 0.787552 0.8931 0.602641 0.747276 0.66721 0.8931 5.7261
10 0.855663 0.81442 0.769063 0.81442 0.787469 0.893047 0.602523 0.74713 0.66708 0.893047 5.5939
17 0.855622 0.814354 0.769006 0.814354 0.787408 0.892859 0.602437 0.747023 0.666984 0.892859 5.2143
4 0.855602 0.814323 0.768979 0.814323 0.787379 0.893145 0.602397 0.746973 0.66694 0.893145 5.8239
7 0.855552 0.814243 0.768911 0.814243 0.787306 0.892894 0.602293 0.746844 0.666825 0.892894 5.1902
1 0.855533 0.814212 0.768884 0.814212 0.787277 0.893143 0.602253 0.746794 0.66678 0.893143 6.6694
15 0.855521 0.814193 0.768868 0.814193 0.787259 0.893068 0.602228 0.746763 0.666752 0.893068 5.4579
11 0.855434 0.814053 0.768748 0.814053 0.787131 0.892791 0.602046 0.746537 0.666551 0.892791 5.5301
8 0.855268 0.813787 0.768521 0.813787 0.786887 0.892802 0.6017 0.746109 0.666168 0.892802 6.4253
6 0.851816 0.808259 0.76379 0.808259 0.781805 0.896883 0.59451 0.737193 0.658207 0.896883 5.4997
14 0.851678 0.808037 0.7636 0.808037 0.7816 0.896849 0.594221 0.736835 0.657888 0.896849 5.3444
13 0.85166 0.80801 0.763577 0.80801 0.781575 0.8967 0.594185 0.73679 0.657848 0.8967 5.6395
18 0.851602 0.807904 0.763496 0.807904 0.781485 0.896612 0.594069 0.736607 0.657704 0.896612 5.4828
20 0.851484 0.807727 0.763335 0.807727 0.781315 0.896566 0.593817 0.736333 0.65744 0.896566 5.5712
16 0.851342 0.807499 0.76314 0.807499 0.781106 0.896338 0.593521 0.735967 0.657113 0.896338 5.7013
3 0.851282 0.807404 0.763059 0.807404 0.781018 0.896527 0.593398 0.735814 0.656976 0.896527 5.3711
2 0.851282 0.807403 0.763058 0.807403 0.781018 0.896273 0.593396 0.735812 0.656975 0.896273 6.0793
9 0.851241 0.807338 0.763002 0.807338 0.780958 0.896373 0.593311 0.735707 0.656881 0.896373 5.4573
12 0.851177 0.807236 0.762914 0.807236 0.780863 0.896528 0.593178 0.735541 0.656733 0.896528 5.3046
Table 6.7. Principal component analysis (PCA) training data evaluation
metrics table.
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Iteration Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 Macro-ROC Precision Recall F1 ROC Time
8 0.88197 0.883293 0.500016 0.883293 0.468674 0.909814 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.909814 0.9322
1 0.881901 0.883258 0.500016 0.883258 0.468654 0.910061 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.910061 1.1839
19 0.881852 0.883234 0.500016 0.883234 0.468641 0.910491 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.910491 0.8296
10 0.881808 0.883212 0.500016 0.883212 0.468628 0.909745 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.909745 0.9687
17 0.881808 0.883212 0.500016 0.883212 0.468628 0.909967 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.909967 0.843
4 0.881792 0.883204 0.500016 0.883204 0.468624 0.910157 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.910157 0.8573
5 0.881757 0.883186 0.500016 0.883186 0.468614 0.909917 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.909917 0.883
11 0.881737 0.883176 0.500016 0.883176 0.468608 0.910082 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.910082 0.9452
7 0.881679 0.883147 0.500016 0.883147 0.468592 0.909964 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.909964 0.8656
15 0.881676 0.883146 0.500016 0.883146 0.468591 0.910166 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064 0.910166 0.8763
14 0.879623 0.862889 0.500015 0.862889 0.468009 0.917315 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.917315 0.8991
13 0.879504 0.862829 0.500015 0.862829 0.467975 0.91736 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.91736 0.8642
18 0.879397 0.862776 0.500015 0.862776 0.467944 0.917235 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.917235 0.8393
6 0.879365 0.862759 0.500015 0.862759 0.467935 0.917357 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.917357 0.9632
16 0.879336 0.862745 0.500015 0.862745 0.467927 0.91722 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.91722 1.1638
9 0.879199 0.862676 0.500015 0.862676 0.467888 0.9172 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.9172 0.9278
3 0.879174 0.862664 0.500015 0.862664 0.467881 0.917208 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.917208 0.8253
2 0.879044 0.862599 0.500015 0.862599 0.467844 0.917239 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.917239 0.8565
12 0.878905 0.862529 0.500015 0.862529 0.467805 0.917177 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.917177 0.8492
20 0.878859 0.862506 0.500015 0.862506 0.467792 0.91719 0.00003 0.846154 0.00006 0.91719 0.8788
Table 6.8. Principal component analysis (PCA) test data evaluation metrics
table.
Figure 6.28. Time elapsed for training and validating each model.
Figure 6.29. Training and validation balanced accuracy metric for each
model.
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Figure 6.30. Training and validation macro F1 score metric for each model.
Figure 6.31. Training and validation macro precision score metric for each
model.
Figure 6.32. Training and validation macro recall score metric for each
model.
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Figure 6.33. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for each model.
Figure 6.34. Training and validation precision versus recall trade-off for
iteration 19.
Figure 6.35. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for iteration 19.
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The confusion matrix below for principal component analysis (PCA) attests
that the algorithm performs admirably. Evaluation of the training set revealed that
the model was able to successfully identify 75% (434,116 out of 580,764) of mali-
cious transactions with a considerable rate of 25% (146,648 out of 580,764) false-
positives. However, 88% (Malicious: 23 out of 26 and Non-Malicious: 5,334,853 out
of 6,049,601) of both malicious and non-malicious data points were successfully de-
tected in test data, with a low percentage of 12% (Malicious: 3 out of 26 and 714,748
out of 6,049,601) of false-positive cases.
Figure 6.36. Training and validation percentage confusion matrix for itera-
tion 19.
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6.5 K-means
Arthur and Vassilvitskii (2007) explain K-means clustering performance is not gravely
affected by the vast data volume. Due to the categorization nature of k-means clus-
tering, unlike other algorithms in this thesis experiments, the data is not sub-sampled
into several chunks. K-means can handle a lot of data and categorizes it into groups
in which data points are similar to each other. This experiment aims to detect and
distinguish groups of data points that contain a maximum occurrence of malicious
and non-malicious data points. All training data is fed into the k-means cluster-
ing algorithm with varied k variable values to generate k models. All models are
computed with hyper-parameters of 1000 random initializations, 15000 maximum
number of iterations over the complete dataset and batch size of 256. The value of
inertia is computed for each model k; the inertia is defined as the sum of squared
distances (SSD) of samples to their nearest neighbor. This metric is used to select
the best value of k hence producing the best model of k-means clustering. Figure
6.37 is an elbow-shaped plot of SSD against the number of clusters. According to
the Figure 6.37 value of the k = 5 appears to be satisfactory.
Figure 6.37. Plot between k-cluster and sum of squared distances of samples
to their closest cluster center.
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Training Data Test Data
Balanced Accuracy 0.8167213 0.8557088
Macro Precision 0.5000092 0.5000131
Macro Recall 0.8167213 0.8557088
Macro F1 0.4638692 0.4639096
Table 6.9. Training and test data evaluation metrics for the model with K=5.
The model with value k = 5 is evaluated with training data and test data. Table
6.9 describes the evaluation metrics statistics, and the k-means algorithm performed
a decent job in separating the malicious data points from the non-malicious data
points. Based on data of table 6.10 and table 6.11, it can be deduced that the model
categorized the majority of malicious data-points in cluster 2 and cluster 4. On the
contrary, the non-malicious data points are majorly designated to cluster 1, cluster
3, and cluster 5.
Cluster Number of Malicious Data Points Percentage of Malicious Data Non-malicious Data Points Percentage of Non-malicious Data
1 10 12.20% 6081677 25.13%
2 49 59.76% 2374469 9.81%
3 1 1.22% 9429675 38.97%
4 14 17.07% 888690 3.67%
5 8 9.76% 5423914 22.41%
Table 6.10. Descriptive analysis of training data clustering for model with
K=5.
Cluster Number of Malicious Data Points Percentage of Malicious Data Non-malicious Data Points Percentage of Non-malicious Data
1 0 0.00% 1520828 25.14%
2 15 57.69% 592487 9.79%
3 1 3.85% 2358009 38.98%
4 7 26.92% 222614 3.68%
5 3 11.54% 1355663 22.41%
Table 6.11. Descriptive analysis of test data clustering for model with K=5.
As observed from the tables above, more than 55% of the anomalous data were
clustered into one cluster along with a considerable amount of the remaining mali-
cious data in another cluster. Nevertheless, the majority of non-malicious data was
distributed in three clusters, with approximately 25%, 38%, and 22% of data in
clusters, respectively, which sums up nearly 85% of the data.
A visual illustration of the clusters is created by performing principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) as a dimensionality reduction technique on the data. The data
is transformed into three dimensions and then plotted into 2-dimensional and 3-
dimensional space. The plot in figure 6.38 represents a 2-dimensional plot of test
data with the first principal component as its x-axis and the second principal com-
ponent as its y-axis. A different color represents all clusters in the plot with a black
square representing the center of that cluster along with the number of that par-
ticular cluster. Red data points in the visual illustration depict the malicious data
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points, and as seen in the plot, the majority of them lay in cluster 2 and cluster 4.
Figure 6.38. 2-dimensional plot of predicted test data representing all clus-
ters data and their cluster centers.
Figure 6.39 and Figure 6.40 are 3-dimensional space illustrations that give a clear
understanding of how malicious and non-malicious data are clustered and distin-
guished from each other. In the 3-dimensional space, each axis is represented by a
principal component extracted from the actual data.
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Figure 6.39. 3-dimensional plot of predicted test data representing all clus-
ters data and their cluster centers (View 1).
Figure 6.40. 3-dimensional plot of predicted test data representing all clus-
ters data and their cluster centers (View 2).
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In order to create a conventional prediction confusion matrix, the clusters with
the majority of malicious data points (Cluster 2 and Cluster 4) were merged into
one. Conversely, clusters with the majority of non-malicious data points (Cluster 1,
Cluster 3, and Cluster 5) were also merged into one. These merged clusters were
labeled as malicious and non-malicious data points to compute a final confusion
matrix. Based on the results, it can be observed that the k-means clustering model
performed decently. The model with k = 5 was able to detect 77% (63 out of 82)
of malicious data and 87% (20,935,266 out of 24,198,425) of non-malicious data in
training data. It also successfully detected 85% (22 out of 26) of malicious data in
test data along with 87% (5,234,500 out of 6,049,601) of non-malicious data, whereas
the false-positives were only 15% (4 out of 22).
Figure 6.41. Training and validation percentage confusion matrix.
6.6 Deep Autoencoders
Canziani, Paszke, and Culurciello (2016) describe that Deep neural networks are
capable of handling a large amount of data; however, the model computation time
can be enormous. Pre-processed data is split into training and test sets and feed
into the deep autoencoder network. In order to be able to find a hidden pattern
of malicious data points within the imbalanced data set, the training set is over-
sampled with 0.8% of synthetically generated malicious data points using Synthetic
Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE). Table 6.12 represents the structure
of the neural network designed to encode and decode the data while trying to learn
reconstruction.
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Layer Layer Type Layer elements Activation Function
Input Input 7 attributes (none)
Encoder Dense 7 neurons tanh
Encoder Dense 7 neurons tanh
Encoder Dense 6 neurons tanh
Encoder Dense 4 neurons tanh
Decoder Dense 4 neurons tanh
Decoder Dense 6 neurons tanh
Decoder Dense 7 neurons sigmoid
Output Output 7 attributes (none)
Table 6.12. The network structure of deep autoencoder designed to detect
anomalies.
The autoencoder is trained with 100 epochs and a batch size of 256. The loss
function selected for this use-case is mean squared logarithmic error (MSLE), as it
only cares about the relative difference between the true and the predicted value, or
in other words, it only cares about the percentual difference between them. Kingma
and Ba (2014), Adam is used as an optimization algorithm with tanh and sigmoid
as the activation functions. The choice of tanh for the encoder and decoder hidden
layers is reasonable as it ranges between [-1,1] whereas, for the output layer, it is
suitable to have data in a range of [0,1] where values between 0 and 1 represent
the estimation of a data point being malicious. Table 6.13 describes the evaluation
metrics obtained from the deep autoencoder model. Both training and test data
were evaluated over the computed model to calculate these metrics.
Training Data Test Data
Balanced Accuracy 0.733119 0.803667
Macro Precision 0.716962 0.500029
Macro Recall 0.733119 0.803667
Macro F1 0.724655 0.488155
ROC AUC 0.870147 0.907563
Time 25075.109 177.6881
Table 6.13. Evaluation results of training data and test data on a deep au-
toencoder network.
Based on the table 6.13, the model is trained with 80% accuracy over the test
data. The area under the curve for the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC)
is 90% for test data is illustrated in figure 6.42. The evaluation of the metrics table
and ROC curve visualization gives a summary of how the model performs in general.
From Figure 6.42, it can be deduced that the difference between the receiver oper-
ating characteristic curve (ROC) of training data and test data is not so significant.
However, a higher AUC score for a model usually represents a better model. Recall
of the autoencoder model shows a satisfying result as recall refers to the percent-
age of total relevant results correctly classified by the algorithm. In this use-case of
detecting malicious and non-malicious data points, a higher recall metric is vital to
the evaluation.
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Figure 6.42. Training and validation area under the curve (AUC) of receiver
operating characteristic curve (ROC) for autoencoder model.
Figure 6.43 represents the trade-off between precision and recall of the model at
different thresholds for training and test data. Extracting a threshold is entirely
based on the goal of our use-case. A value of threshold slightly below 4 seems rea-
sonably satisfactory. Figure 6.44 is a visual illustration of reconstruction for model
prediction based on predicted reconstruction errors. A threshold value slightly be-
low 4 seems to cater to a significant number of malicious data points while not
misclassifying majority of non-malicious data points.
Figure 6.43. Training and validation precision versus recall trade-off for
autoencoder model.
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Figure 6.44. Visual representation of reconstruction error of the test set
from the model predicition to predict the malicious transactions.
Based on the confusion matrix in Figure 6.45, it is apparent that autoencoder
algorithm performed robustly. The computed model was able to successfully detect
65% (17 out of 26) of malicious data points in test data and only 50% (981,142
out of 1,976,769) of malicious data points in training data. The false-positive rate
is higher in comparison to other experiments of this thesis research. The model
misclassified approximately 50% (995,627 out of 1,976,769) of the data points as
false-positive cases for training data and 35% (9 out of 26) for test data. However,
the true-positives had a higher rate of 96% (Training: 23,294,998 out of 24,198,425
and Test: 5,823,535 out of 6,049,601) in both training and test data evaluation.
Figure 6.45. Training and validation percentage confusion matrix for au-
toencoder model.
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6.7 Ensemble Classification
The test set used in all experiments is fed to an ensemble classifier. This ensemble
classifier is composed by combining all the models computed for experiments in
this thesis. The pre-processed test data consists of 26 malicious data points and
6,049,601 non-malicious data points. All the pre-computed model’s from algorithms
including Isolation Forest, Histogram based outlier score (HBOS), Cluster-based
local outlier factor (CBLOF), Principal component analysis (PCA), K-means and
Deep autoencoder are used to formulate a voting algorithm. Classification result from
each algorithm is equally weighted, and as this use-case only requires an ensemble
method for prediction, it is time-efficient.
Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 ROC AUC
Test Data 0.801402 0.500027 0.801402 0.48696 0.915766
Table 6.14. Evaluation metrics for ensemble classification.
Statistics computed after evaluating the ensemble classifier are shown in table
6.14. The ensemble classification method provides a robust result based on a major-
ity voting algorithm. The area under the curve (AUC) of receiver operating charac-
teristic curve (ROC) in figure 6.46 along with other statistics such as Macro-Recall
as whole, states that the ensemble method performs significantly stable than previ-
ously evaluated algorithms.
Figure 6.46. Area under the curve (AUC) of receiver operating characteristic
curve (ROC) for ensemble classification of all models.
The evaluation was only performed for the test set as ensemble classification does
not require its own training for this use-case. Figure 6.47 represents a visual illus-
tration of a trade-off between precision and recall of the ensemble classification at
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different thresholds. An optimal threshold is selected automatically based on an
algorithm in the library we are utilizing for anomaly detection. Based on the con-
fusion matrix in Figure 6.48 it is apparent that the ensemble classifier performed
robustly and satisfactorily. 65% (17 out of 26) of the malicious data points were suc-
cessfully detected, with only 35% (9 out of 26) of misclassification of false-positives.
Equally important, 95% (5,740,820 out of 6,049,601) of non-malicious data points
were correctly classified, with only 5% (308,781 out of 6,049,601) of true-negatives.
Figure 6.47. Precision versus Recall trade-off for ensemble classification of
all models.
Figure 6.48. Confusion matrix for ensemble classification of all models.
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7 Comparison
This chapter describes the comparison between the results of all experiments per-
formed for this thesis. There are total of seven algorithms that are used to detect
malicious and non-malicious transactions in the bitcoin data set used for this re-
search. Table 7.1 describes the evaluation statistics computed for each algorithm.
All evaluation metrics have their significance based on what kind of solution is re-
quired. This thesis research intends to maximize the malicious and non-malicious
transaction detection while minimizing false-positive cases. Some algorithms per-
form better than the other, while ensemble classifier accounts for a vote from all
algorithms to make a decision.
Classifer Accuracy Balanced-Accuracy Macro-Precision Macro-Recall Macro-F1 ROC AUC Precision Recall F1
IForest 0.969937 0.792662 0.500043 0.792662 0.492457 0.905661 0.000088 0.615385 0.000176
HBOS 0.871294 0.839493 0.500013 0.839493 0.465637 0.913317 0.000027 0.807692 0.000054
CBLOF 0.848902 0.789836 0.50001 0.789836 0.459159 0.818955 0.000021 0.730769 0.000042
PCA 0.881852 0.883234 0.500016 0.883234 0.468641 0.910491 0.000032 0.884615 0.000064
Kmeans 0.865264 0.855709 0.500013 0.855709 0.46391 NA 0.000027 0.846154 0.000054
Autoencoder 0.988407 0.744205 0.500092 0.744205 0.49727 0.884123 0.000185 0.5 0.000371
Ensemble 0.948957 0.801402 0.500027 0.801402 0.48696 0.915766 0.000055 0.653846 0.00011
Table 7.1. Evaluation metrics of all algorithm models computed on test data.
Figure 7.1. Comparison of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for
all algorithms.
Based on the tabular data from table 7.1 and a comparative illustration in figure
7.1 of the area under the curve of ROC along with the comparison of precision and
recall plots in figure 7.2 and figure 7.3, it is difficult to determine the best choice.
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Figure 7.2. Precision com-
parison.
Figure 7.3. Recall compar-
ison.
However, there is a trade-off between robustness and optimal performance. In terms
of robustness ensemble method seems a better choice as it takes into account a
deciding vote from six classifiers before making its decision, and this vote can have
variable weights adjusted for each algorithm based on use-case. Nevertheless, for
optimal solo performance, there is a tough competition between Isolation Forest,
HBOS, K-means, Autoencoder, and PCA. Figure 7.4 is a histogram representing
the accuracies of each model on the test set, solely relying only on accuracy for
model selection is not wise in this particular use-case. Relying only on accuracy can
be misleading.
Figure 7.4. Histogram comparing accuracies of all models.
Macro evaluation metrics are useful indicators in scenarios where the overall per-
formance of the system needs to be taken into consideration. A histogram represents
a comparison of macro recall for all algorithms in Figure 7.5, and the histogram in
Figure 7.6 illustrates the comparison of the macro-f1 scores for all algorithms. Based
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on the visual illustrations of these macro evaluation metrics, ensemble method per-
forms more stably and robustly. The robustness of an algorithm characterises how
effective that algorithm performs on independent but similar data. However, isola-
tion forest, k-means, principal component analysis (PCA), and autoencoder perform
slightly better. The selection of one algorithm out of these is challenging and may
require more in-depth use-case scenario information.
Figure 7.5. Histogram comparing macro recall metric for all algorithms.
Figure 7.6. Histogram comparing macro f1 metric for all algorithms.
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8 Conclusion
Evaluation of multiple unsupervised algorithms to detect anomalous behavior in an
unspent transaction output (UTXO) based blockchain shows that malicious activi-
ties can be successfully identified. This goes in line with other research on anomaly
detection in blockchains. If the evaluation metrics of previous researches were dis-
closed, the comparison would have been even more apparent. Although it can be
indirectly compared to credit card fraud detection, the dynamics of data are entirely
different and hence induce a variety of complex challenges.
It is possible that better results would have been obtained with more malicious
data. The small size of malicious transactional data points in the dataset means that
there is little anomalous patterns to recognize. An attempt was made to overcome
this problem by synthetically generating malicious data points while making sure
that it is not overdone. However, this affects the quality of anomaly detection, which
leads to weaker performance of the models.
The selection of extracted features from the blockchain transaction graph to de-
termine anomalous behavior seems an essential factor as certain variables may hold
a unique prospect. Such as when treated as a time-series problem, it may disclose
different solutions. However, this thesis research focuses on finding anomalous pat-
terns using unsupervised learning techniques, and having a time-series element in
the problem would increase the complexity of the scope.
Nonetheless, researchers have experimented with various unsupervised techniques
to detect anomalous transactions in a blockchain and discovered somewhat success-
ful ways to achieve it. However, the lack of relevant data and computing power
limitations, along with algorithm’s data handling capabilities, induce complex chal-
lenges.
Anomaly detection within blockchains can improve in the future if certain ele-
ments progress, such as the availability of relevant and rich data. Feature engineering
and approaching the problem from another prospect such as time-series or network
analysis can unlock new potential solutions. Additionally, distributed computing can
be utilized to enhance algorithm’s computing capabilities.
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